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ABSTRACT
By the 1970s, quid pro quo policy, which requires multinational ﬁrms to transfer technology in
return for market access, had become a common practice in many developing countries. While
many countries have subsequently liberalized quid pro quo requirements, China continues to follow
the policy. In this paper, we incorporate quid pro quo policy into a multicountry dynamic general
equilibrium model, using microevidence from Chinese patents to motivate key assumptions about
the terms of the technology transfer deals and macroevidence on China’s inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) to estimate key model parameters. We then use the model to quantify the
impact of China’s quid pro quo policy and show that it has had a signiﬁcant impact on global
innovation and welfare.
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Debates have long been waged over appropriate policies for the encouragement of technology trans-
fer to developing countries (see UNCTAD, 2001). By the 1970s, quid pro quo policy, which requires
multinational ﬁrms to transfer technology in return for market access, had become a common prac-
tice in many developing countries. While many countries have subsequently liberalized quid pro
quo requirements, China continues to follow the policy. In this paper, we incorporate quid pro quo
policy into a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model, using microevidence from Chinese
patents to motivate key assumptions about the terms of the technology transfer deals and macroev-
idence on China’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to estimate key model parameters. We
then use the model to quantify the impact of China’s quid pro quo policy and show that it has
had a signiﬁcant impact on global innovation and welfare.
The model is an extension of the multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model of FDI
developed in McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010). The key concept of the framework is technology
capital, which is nonrivalrous capital that can be used across locations. Examples of technology
capital include accumulated know-how from investments in R&D and brands. Once a ﬁrm makes
an investment in technology capital in its home country, it can utilize the capital in other markets
around the world as foreign countries open up to FDI. In addition to extending the McGrattan and
Prescott model by incorporating quid pro quo, we also introduce an intensity margin that allows
foreign ﬁrms to choose how much technology capital to bring into host countries. The fact that
quid pro quo acts like a tax induces foreign ﬁrms to hold back on the level of technology capital
they deploy in a host country. Furthermore, once technology capital is transferred, investments
necessary to exploit the technology are measured as domestic investment rather than as FDI.
Consistent with our theory, relatively little of China’s inward FDI comes from advanced
economies that do the vast majority of the world’s R&D, that is, from the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan. For example, Branstetter and Foley (2010) show that FDI ﬂows from the
United States into China are small relative to ﬂows of U.S. FDI to other destination countries, as
well as relative to FDI ﬂows from other source countries into China.1 In fact, even as China has
risen and its demand for advanced products like automobiles has exploded, the share of FDI inﬂows
into China from advanced economies (again, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan) has
actually decreased signiﬁcantly, as Figure 1 illustrates for the period 1990–2010.2
A key assumption of our theory, based on microevidence from Chinese patent applications, is
that the property rights being exchanged apply in China, not outside; for example, the joint venture
Shanghai GM can sell Chevrolets and Buicks in China, but not in the United States. An important
1 See also Prasad and Wei (2007).
2 As explained below, we combine ﬂows for mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao—netting out
intraprovincial ﬂows—and refer to the combined economic region as China. We also exclude ﬂows from the
tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands (BVI) and the Cayman Islands.
1implication of this assumption is that even as China develops and accumulates signiﬁcant property
rights to technology capital in China, FDI outﬂows from China to the advanced economies will
remain low. After 1985, an explosion in patenting took place in China. Prior to 1985, the patent
system did not even exist, but its scale is now comparable to the systems in the United States,
Europe, and Japan.3 Indeed, in a single decade, from 2000 to 2010, the domestic share of published
patents in China increased from 37 percent to 73 percent. Yet, despite this explosion in Chinese
patenting, FDI outﬂows from China to the advanced economies continue to be relatively small,
consistent with our theory (see Figure 2).
To understand the economic eﬀects of quid pro quo, a useful approach is to compare and
contrast quid pro quo policy with a tax imposed by a host country on FDI proﬁts. Both distort
investment decisions, and both entail a payment by foreign ﬁrms to the host government—payment
in cash in the case of a tax on proﬁts and payment with technology capital in the case of quid pro
quo. The key diﬀerence lies in what happens after payment. With a tax, foreign ﬁrms continue
to own and manage the technology, whereas with quid pro quo requirements, management is
reallocated to domestic ﬁrms, and this result can have signiﬁcant eﬀects on productivity. In
particular, domestic management need not confront the barriers to investment that foreign ﬁrms
face, which implies a productivity gain, in part because the transferred technology is no longer
subject to further quid pro quo and the distortions that accompany it. This productivity gain may
potentially be oﬀset by a loss in eﬀective management of the technology when it is transferred from
the foreign to the domestic ﬁrms. We allow for such a loss in our analysis.
We use our quantitative model to conduct welfare analysis and to estimate the extent of tech-
nology transfer in China over the period 1990–2010. The model has six economies, namely, China,
the United States, Western Europe, Japan, an entity comprising Brazil, Russia, and India, referred
to as BRI, and the rest of the world. Key model parameters include those that determine the quid
pro quo policy that the advanced economies face, country-level policy parameters that govern over-
all openness to FDI, and country-level total factor productivity (TFP). We select parameters to
align the model and the data over the period 1990–2010 with respect to relative FDI inﬂows into
China by the advanced economies, overall FDI inﬂows into each country, and relative GDP levels
of each country. We then simulate the economy with quid pro quo policies as observed and a coun-
terfactual with China abandoning quid pro quo starting in 1991. A key result is that the advanced
economies lose the equivalent of about 0.3 to 0.5 percent in consumption because of China’s quid
pro quo. China is now large enough that its policies materially aﬀect the welfare of the advanced
economies and the incentives for multinational ﬁrms to create technology capital. On the other
3 In 2011, the patent oﬃce in China granted 172,000 patents, compared with 225,000, 98,000, and 238,000 patents
granted by the oﬃces in the United States, Europe, and Japan (the Europe statistic combines the European
patent oﬃce with the oﬃces in Germany, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom). See World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO, 2012)
2hand, China beneﬁts signiﬁcantly from the policy, with a gain in consumption of nearly 5 percent.
Indeed, China beneﬁts from quid pro quo so much that it would choose to follow this policy even
if other countries choose to follow it as well. In contrast, the United States and Western Europe
are left worse oﬀ in a world in which all countries follow quid pro quo, compared with a world
where no countries follow it. In addition to the eﬀects on consumption, quid pro quo leads to a
signiﬁcant increase in the fraction of technology capital used in China that is transferred to China.
Thus, the quid pro quo policy is both welfare enhancing and fulﬁlls the Chinese government’s goal
of having indigenous innovation.4
Ample evidence supports the key mechanisms of the model. Prior to 2001, when China joined
the World Trade Organization (WTO), quid pro quo transfer of technology was explicit Chinese
policy. Since then, the policy has become implicit and is accomplished through requirements such
as joint ventures. Surveys of multinationals (cited below) conﬁrm that quid pro quo is an implicit
policy, and a majority of survey respondents say that policy requirements are increasing over
time. Furthermore, microevidence from patent data supports the key assumption of the model
that transferred property rights apply inside China, not outside. We construct a unique data set
of Chinese patents—with foreign and domestic patents separately catalogued—and we use it to
determine which patents go outside of China in the form of patents in other countries. We focus
in particular on patents in China that are jointly owned by a foreign multinational and a local
Chinese partner. These patents come out of the various joint ventures that foreign ﬁrms have been
forced into as a requirement for obtaining market access. They are direct evidence of technology
connections between foreign and domestic ﬁrms and direct evidence of Chinese ﬁrms obtaining
property rights in China. We document a distinct empirical ﬁnding about these jointly owned
patents: the property rights of the Chinese partners stop at the border. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
jointly owned Chinese patents tend not to link to patent applications in foreign countries. In cases
in which such a link does exist outside, only the foreign partner’s name is on the application;
the Chinese partner’s name is dropped. An interesting example in our data set is the case of
the joint venture between the foreign telecommunications giant Alcatel-Lucent and the domestic
ﬁrm Shanghai Bell. Through 2010, 97 of the jointly owned patents in China have gone outside in
the form of WIPO applications. Yet, in all but ﬁve cases, the applications explicitly state that
Shanghai Bell ownership applies only in China, whereas Alcatel-Lucent ownership applies in China
and everywhere else.
Among developing countries, signiﬁcant precedent exists for policies that promote technology
transfer from foreign to domestic ﬁrms. In the postwar period, Japan, and then Korea, pursued
4 The plan, which is laid out in China State Council (2006), states China’s goal for zizhu chuangxin; zizhu means
“indigenous” or “self-owned,” and chuangxin means “innovation.” See the discussion in USITC (2010).
3policies that limited FDI inﬂows.5 Technology from foreign ﬁrms generally came in through licens-
ing deals with domestic ﬁrms.6 A situation in which domestic ﬁrms ﬁrst license a technology, and
then imitate that technology, is quid pro quo of sorts, albeit one that does not show up in FDI
ﬂows. But many examples can be found of countries adopting policies to regulate FDI. For exam-
ple, in the 1970s, India, Brazil, the Philippines, Mexico, and the Andean Community, comprising
the South American countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (known as the Andean
Pact until 1996), variously imposed joint venture requirements with local partners, government
reviews of all contracts, and limits on the ability of foreign ﬁrms to write contracts that would
preserve ﬁrms’ ownership of technology capital.7 In fact, in the 1980s, a number of developing
countries worked within the United Nations to implement an international agreement that would
facilitate use of quid pro quo under international law.8 Although that initiative was ultimately
unsuccessful, technology transfer continues to be a fault line in international negotiations between
developed and developing countries. The WTO website notes that “developing countries in partic-
ular, see technology transfer as part of the bargain in which they have agreed to protect intellectual
property rights,” referring to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement on intellectual property.9 That is, in a broad sense, technology transfer is quid pro quo
for developed countries to earn rents on their technology capital in developing countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section
3 presents evidence in support of the key mechanisms in our model. Section 4 describes our
multicountry general equilibrium model. Section 5 explains how the model parameters are pinned
down by the data. Section 6 conducts policy analysis. Section 7 discusses robustness, and Section
8 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Much of the literature on FDI focuses on the margin of whether a particular ﬁrm sells in a foreign
market through exports or by setting up a foreign aﬃliate (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992;
5 For a discussion of an “elaborate control system...designed to ﬁlter out most inﬂows of FDI” in Japan, see
Mason (1992, p. 151). For a discussion on Korea, see Kim and Hwang (2000).
6 For U.S. ﬁrms, there was “one real ‘option’ to participate in the postwar economy: license technology to a
Japanese ﬁrm” (Mason, 1992, p. 151). See also Montalvo and Yafeh (1994). For some discussion of Korea, see
Chapter 7 of Moran (1999), “FDI and Technology-Licensing Requirements.”
7 See McCulloch (1981) for a discussion. Banned provisions included “grant back” clauses that made technolog-
ical improvements arising through a joint venture the property of the foreign partner. See Barnes (1979) and
UNCTAD (2003). Some of these policies have persisted. Brazil, for example, continues to review technology
transfer agreements and ban such clauses. See WIPO (2013).
8 See the 1985 Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, as published in UNCTAD
(1996), and see UNCTAD (2001) for discussion.
9 See World Trade Organization, TRIPS material, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/techtransfer e.
htm, accessed July 23, 2014.
4Markusen and Venables, 2000; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; and Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-
Clare, 2013). Taking into account that consumption goods come in diﬀerent varieties is essential
to these analyses because this diﬀerentiation motivates exports and imports of goods between
countries—that is, wool for wine. In contrast, our model has only a single consumption good,
and the main force for aggregate trade ﬂows is imperfectly correlated total factor productivities
(as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992). Our emphasis is on companies using FDI to sell to
local consumers, not as an export base. Each unit of technology capital has a potential use in
production at each location; to realize the potential use, the capital must be deployed locally.
Although in general there are important connections between FDI and trade, we believe that
abstracting from trade in diﬀerentiated consumption goods in the context of this study is useful
for two main reasons. First, the entry regulations for selling in the domestic market (ordinary
trade) are more stringent—and quid pro quo policy has more bite here—than the regulations for
selling only in export markets (processing trade).10 These diﬀerences are not surprising because
the Chinese government has a monopoly over access to its domestic market, whereas it might
face competition with other countries to be an export base to other markets. Second, FDI aimed
at the local market is a signiﬁcant component of the FDI going into China.11 For example, the
automobile industry is one of the major industries with inﬂows into China from the United States,
Europe, and Japan. The joint ventures that are set up as part of these inﬂows sell primarily to
the domestic market.
Our model of multinational ﬁrms puts the Arrow-Debreu structure of perfect competition
to work in analyzing foreign direct investment. The curvature in a ﬁrm’s problem comes from
increasing marginal cost as marginal revenue is constant. It is more common in the international
economics literature to employ monopolistic competition, where the curvature in a ﬁrm’s problem
comes from decreasing marginal revenue as marginal cost is constant (see, for example, Helpman
Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). The motivation for our choice is that the competitive framework
builds on an extensive body of work in macroeconomics that has shown conformity of aggregate
predictions with data from the national and international accounts. We suspect, however, that
our results would be very similar if we extended the framework to allow for increasing returns and
monopolistic competition.
An enormous empirical literature examines the extent to which knowledge spillovers from
multinational investment ﬂow to domestic companies in host nations. Typically, these studies
regress measures of productivity of local companies on some measure of geographic proximity of
FDI. Hale and Long (2011, 2012) survey the literature that focuses on China and contribute to it by
10 For example, in 1986 China adopted a policy in which foreign ﬁrms selling only to export markets could enter
as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, rather than through a forced joint venture. See Branstetter and Lardy
(2006).
11 See Branstetter and Foley (2010) and Defever and Ria˜ no (2012), who show that most of the foreign ﬁrms that
use China as an export base are from Taiwan and Hong Kong.
5studying ﬁrm-level data from a World Bank survey, ﬁnding mixed results. The standard approach
to modeling knowledge spillovers is to treat them as an externality. Productivity is higher when
more ﬁrms invest, but since any one ﬁrm is a small part of the total, ﬁrms do not take the spillovers
into account in their investment decisions. In our baseline model, we abstract from the presence of
such spillovers but also consider a speciﬁcation in which the spillovers are operative; in this way,
we recognize the mixed results in the literature. Regarding the model’s ability to ﬁt FDI ﬂows and
a number of other variables, whether we allow for spillovers turns out not to matter very much.
In contrast, allowing for the quid pro quo mechanism has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on FDI ﬂows. The
key diﬀerence is that with quid quo pro, a ﬁrm internalizes the eﬀective tax on entry when doing
FDI. With spillovers, the eﬀect is external, thereby limiting the ability of the spillover channel to
inﬂuence the FDI decisions.12
One example from the literature that takes a quantitative theoretical approach, as we do here,
is the model of international technology diﬀusion in Eaton and Kortum (1999). The authors trace
how ideas patented in one country diﬀuse abroad as patents in other countries. Our analysis of
whether Chinese patents go outside of China is in keeping with the spirit of their work. Our
work diﬀers from theirs, however, in at least four ways. First, although their structure allows for
imitation, it does not incorporate the quid quo pro mechanism that is central here. Second, we
focus on the transition dynamics of knowledge transfer between developed countries and developing
countries, such as the United States and China, whereas Eaton and Kortum (1999) explore a
steady-state relationship between developed countries, such as the United States and Germany.
Third, in addition to looking at patent statistics, we focus on data on FDI ﬂows. Fourth, our
modeling environment with perfectly competitive ﬁrms is diﬀerent from the structure of Bertrand
oligopoly they use (which is based on Grossman and Helpman, 1991a), but we acknowledge that
our aggregate approach leaves out potentially interesting strategic interactions at the microlevel
from head-to-head competition between a small number of competitors.13
An earlier literature emphasizes the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of greater FDI and the
costs of diminishing the value of intellectual property holdings. Theoretical contributions to this
literature include Grossman and Helpman (1991b) and Helpman (1993), who study growth models
with two regions—North and South—with the South imitating products from the North. Lai
(1998) extends these models to allow the degree of imitation to be a function of whether the ﬁrm
engages in FDI in the South (see also Markusen, 2001). In these papers, the beneﬁt to the North is
lower production costs, which is diﬀerent from the beneﬁt of market access that we focus on here.
12 Note that since intangible investments are not included in GDP, measured productivity in our model is not the
same as true productivity, and therefore results of productivity regressions with data from our model could be
be misleading.
13 For example, a Bertrand oligopoly approach would set up a “prisoner’s dilemma”-like game between foreign
ﬁrms. Firms might gain from holding back technology cooperatively. However, China might play them oﬀ
against each other and get technology transfer in equilibrium.
6Also, some empirical work ﬁnds that imitation is a deterrent to FDI. For example, Branstetter et
al. (2011) present regression evidence that multinational companies increase their FDI after host
nations strengthen their intellectual property protection.
This paper highlights the relatively low investment ﬂows between China and the technologically
advanced economies and, in particular, the fact that the share of ﬂows from advanced countries have
been falling in recent years. An existing literature considers frictions that limit FDI ﬂows between
pairs of countries due to characteristics speciﬁc to the pair, such as diﬀerences in language and
geographic distance. (Recent examples are Keller and Yeaple, 2013, and Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-
Clare, 2013.) In our robustness analysis, we consider a version of the model without quid pro quo
but include an additional friction that limits FDI ﬂows between countries in the West, such as the
United States and Western Europe, and countries in the East, such as China. The friction depresses
the levels of inﬂows and outﬂows. Since frictions like language diﬀerences and geographic distance
are constant over time, however, this alternative model without quid pro quo cannot account for
why the share of inward FDI from advanced countries is falling over time.
Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) propose the Linder hypothesis as an alternative
explanation for the relatively low investment ﬂows between China and the technologically advanced
economies, but this theory also has counterfactual predictions for the time paths of FDI ﬂows.
The idea behind the Linder hypothesis is that countries with similar incomes are more likely to
be FDI partners, as compared with countries with diﬀerent incomes, because they share similar
consumption patterns. For example, a rich country like Germany will tend to make luxury cars—
such as BMWs and Mercedes—which are sold by their aﬃliates in rich countries like the United
States, rather than in poor countries like India where the world’s lowest-priced car is made (the
$3,000 Tata Nano). In the theory, diﬀerences in income turn out to be similar to diﬀerences in
language and geographic distance in creating eﬀective barriers to FDI ﬂows. If we apply the Linder
hypothesis to the case of FDI between China and the advanced economies, we ﬁnd that it implies
counterfactually that the relative share of FDI inﬂows from the advanced (rich) countries into
China should be increasing as China moves up the income ladder, contrary to what we see in the
data.
Finally, although we use theory to indirectly measure investments that are not counted in
China’s national accounts, such as R&D and investment in brands, some recent work attempts to
directly measure these investments. Hulten and Hao (2012) estimate that intangible investment
in China was 7.5 percent of GDP in 2006, although they acknowledge that the exercise is “greatly
hampered by uncertainty about the accuracy of the data” (p. 6). Furthermore, considerable debate
surrounds the source of the intangible investments—that is, whether the government is the source of
the spending in order to meet its goals for technological advancement or whether ﬁrms are choosing
to make the investments themselves (see Hao, 2012). Here, we use a theoretical framework, which
7is parameterized in such a way as to be consistent with measured statistics in the national and
international accounts, to indirectly infer the intangible investment in China and elsewhere.14
3. Evidence for the Mechanisms
In this section, we present evidence for the key mechanisms we introduce into our model. First,
we document the existence of the quid pro quo trade-oﬀ that foreign ﬁrms face in China, namely,
technology capital in exchange for market access. Second, we provide evidence that the rights
being traded are for rights inside China, not outside. Third, we provide evidence that the United
States, Europe, and Japan are the technological leaders and, as such, have more to oﬀer in quid
pro quo arrangements than other countries that invest in China.
3.1. Quid Pro Quo: Technology Capital Transfer for Market Access
We start by documenting that access to China’s market for multinational ﬁrms in high technol-
ogy industries comes at the price of technology transfer. Prior to China’s 2001 accession to the
WTO, quid pro quo (henceforth QPQ) was explicit policy. For example, in 1994, China’s State
Planning Commission introduced a policy initiative that detailed the speciﬁc technology transfer
requirements for foreign ﬁrms that wanted to enter the domestic automobile market. All foreign
investment had to be in the form of a joint venture with a domestic partner. The policy initiative
contained a technology threshold for the joint venture, requiring it to have “the capacity for manu-
facturing products which attain the international technological levels of the 1990s.”15 Furthermore,
the policy required that “an oﬃce responsible for technological research and development must be
set up within the enterprise” (Walsh, 1999, p. 47). Under the terms of accession to the WTO,
technology transfer requirements for market access are not permitted, and the Chinese government
is generally careful not to make explicit statements about QPQ.16 Nevertheless, the widely held
view—in government reports and throughout the business community—is that China continues
to impose technology transfer requirements as an implicit policy.17 Maintenance of this policy is
consistent with oﬃcial Chinese government pronouncements that a key policy goal is indigenous
innovation.
14 In recent work, Ramondo, Rappaport, and Ruhl (2012) study intraﬁrm trade of U.S. multinationals and provide
evidence consistent with the view that a primary motivation for FDI is the transfer of intangible inputs—rather
than tangible inputs—across production units.
15 The policy paper was published under the title “Automotive Industry Industrial Policy” (see Walsh, 1999,
Table 17). See also U.S. Congress (1987) for a discussion of earlier Chinese policies on technology transfer.
16 Paragraph 7.3 of the 2001 China accession protocol states, “China shall insure...investment...is not conditioned
on...the transfer of technology” (see WTO, 2001).
17 For the U.S. government, see, in particular, United States International Trade Commission (USITC, 2010).
For Europe, see the European Commission’s (2011) how-to guide for investing in China, which matter-of-factly
notes that “over the years, gaining market access in exchange for bringing foreign technology to China has
been a successful bargain for many European companies.”
8Foreign ﬁrms are generally reluctant to go on record about technology transfer requirements
because of conﬁdentiality issues and fear of retaliation by the Chinese government (see Shea,
2012). Therefore, examining the results of recent conﬁdential surveys is useful. In its 2012 survey
of members, the U.S.-China Business Council—a trade group made up of 230 large U.S. ﬁrms with
signiﬁcant business interests in China—found that “85 percent of companies report that they are at
least somewhat concerned about transferring technology to China” and “36 percent of respondents
indicated they were asked in the past three years to make such a transfer as a requirement for
gaining an investment, project, product or market entry approval” (U.S.-China Business Council,
2012a, 2012b). These ﬁndings are corroborated in another recent survey by the American Chamber
of Commerce in China (AmCham China, 2013). In the survey, 35 percent answered positively to the
question “Is de facto technology transfer as a requirement for market access in China a concern for
you?” Moreover, a majority of those responding indicated that these requirements were increasing
over time rather than decreasing.18 These survey ﬁndings are inconsistent with the notion that
QPQ is a thing of the past now that China is part of the WTO.19
Maintaining a QPQ policy is feasible for China because it has mechanisms in place that
enforce technology transfer. In particular, China continues to impose joint venture requirements in
priority industries. Moreover, joint venture contracts require approval by government oﬃcials, and
these oﬃcials retain signiﬁcant discretion in approval decisions (see Shea, 2012). The main policy
document that regulates entry of foreign ﬁrms into China has categories with speciﬁc notations
about joint ventures, with rules that vary by industry. These rules were introduced in 1995 and
have been updated periodically since then. For example, in the 2007 document, under item 19,
“manufacturing of complete automobiles,” is the stipulation that “foreign investment shall not
exceed 50 percent” (see China Ministry of Commerce, 2007).
3.2. Terms of the Deal: Property Rights Inside China, Not Outside
In principle, one can imagine a deal in which a foreign multinational obtains access to China’s
market in exchange for a particular set of technology capital property rights that apply throughout
the world. Although China has the ambition to own technology capital with global reach, and
although leakage may occur outside of China in FDI technology transfer deals, our hypothesis is
that the property rights being exchanged in market access deals are primarily rights inside China,
not outside. Here, we present evidence from patent data that is consistent with this hypothesis.
We examine initial ownership of new patents by large multinational ﬁrms that are doing FDI in
18 Excluding nonresponses and “Don’t know,” 57 percent chose “Increasing,” 38 percent chose “Staying the
same,” and only 5 percent chose “Decreasing.”
19 Recent research shows that these forced technology transfer deals actually work as intended, namely, they
upgrade the domestic partner. Van Reenen and Yueh (2012), for example, provide evidence that the partner’s
TFP increases after such deals.
9China. We show that although these ﬁrms may jointly hold patents with domestic partners inside
China, shared ownership eﬀectively stops at the border.
Ideally, we would analyze the licensing terms of existing patents, which is the primary channel
for technology transfer (see, for example, discussions in U.S.-China Business Council, 2012a, 2012b,
and European Commission, 2011). We focus on initial ownership of new patents, because this in-
formation is publicly available in the published patent data, whereas licensing terms are generally
conﬁdential. The published data are informative because technology transfer deals potentially lead
to new patents through two channels. First, Chinese contract law creates certain default rights to
ﬁrms’ licensing technology, speciﬁcally the ability to claim property rights for subsequent innova-
tions, and these rights connect technology transfer deals in China with subsequent innovations and
patents (see Articles 343 and 354 of China Supreme People’s Court, 1999). Because of such laws,
the European Union’s Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Centre—a European initiative to help
ﬁrms do business in China—explicitly recommends that ﬁrms “should negotiate a non-exclusive
license to improved technology for the Chinese territory and an exclusive license outside of Chi-
nese territory for the usage of the improved technology (see EUSME Centre, 2014). The second
channel for new patents is the creation of joint venture R&D centers, such as those mandated by
the automobile industry regulation discussed earlier, which are likely to result in jointly owned
patents.
To construct our sample of multinationals, we begin with data for foreign aﬃliate sales, pro-
vided by China’s Ministry of Commerce, for the top 500 foreign aﬃliates in 2007 as ranked by
domestic sales in China. After consolidating business units of the same ﬁrms and excluding ﬁrms
from Taiwan, we are left with a list of 114 large foreign multinationals with aﬃliate sales in China
of $314 billion in 2007.20 Joint ventures are signiﬁcant in the data. In fact, 46 percent of the
aﬃliate sales in the data are in business units where the aﬃliate name includes a Chinese partner
as well as the foreign multinational. Of the 50 largest ﬁrms in the data, 86 percent have at least
one business unit that is a joint venture. Note that reported sales are for the domestic market, not
export processing.21
For this sample, we examine data on patent applications in China for the years 2005–2010
and focus on patents that are classiﬁed as the invention type.22 The data are patent applications
20 The sample includes 34 U.S.-based ﬁrms with total sales of $73 billion. See Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott
(2013) for further details about the construction of the data set.
21 As noted earlier, Chinese regulations separately categorize plants that sell to the domestic market (ordinary
trade) from those that sell to export markets (processing trade). Also, FDI by the United States and Europe
in China is primarily aimed at the domestic market. Statistics reported in Branstetter and Foley (2010, Table
13.6) indicate that in 2006, 73 percent of U.S. aﬃliate sales in China were for the local market.
22 Invention patents require a higher inventive threshold than utility patents. We exclude utility patents because
they are of negligible importance for foreign ﬁrms.
10that have reached the publication phase.23 We examine the text ﬁeld of the applicant name and
determine which patents include the names of the 114 large foreign multinationals. We then classify
a patent as “Shared with Chinese partners” if (i) a Chinese ﬁrm is also listed as owning the patent
or (ii) the business unit listed on the patent is one in which a Chinese ﬁrm has an ownership
stake, based on a search of company documents and news reports. Otherwise, we classify the
patent as “Exclusive.” Across the 2005–2010 sample period, 10,184 patents owned by the foreign
multinationals are shared with a Chinese partner and 199,410 are exclusive, as reported in the top
part of Panel A in Table 1.
The shared patents speak to both the assignment of property rights in China to Chinese ﬁrms
and to a link with the technology of foreign multinationals. Our interest here is whether the
property rights of the Chinese ﬁrms in China extend outside of China. Speciﬁcally, we ask two
questions. First, do the patents themselves link outside of China? We measure this by determining
whether the same patent in China has also been ﬁled as either a U.S. patent application or a WIPO
application.24 Second, in cases in which patents link outside, are the Chinese ﬁrms included in the
owner list on the outside applications?
Regarding the ﬁrst question, Table 1 reports that the fraction of shared patents linked outside
of China is quite low, only 1.7 percent. As for the second question, we have examined the applicant
name ﬁelds of the 177 patents that make up the 1.7 percent with links to U.S. or WIPO applications.
Of these, the Chinese ﬁrm is listed on the outside application in 21 instances. In summary, for
only 21 out of 10,184 shared patents, or 0.2 percent, does Chinese ownership of shared technology
with foreign multinationals extend outside the Chinese border.
To put these ﬁndings into perspective, a useful approach is to examine the extent to which other
Chinese patents link outside. Most foreign-owned patents in China are ﬁled ﬁrst in foreign countries
(typically in the country in which the inventive activity takes place) and afterward brought into
China through a ﬁling at the Chinese patent oﬃce. Patents that start outside, and then come in,
obviously link outside. We can see in Table 1 that 86 percent of the exclusive foreign multinational
patents link outside. To make comparisons more direct, we focus on patents in China ﬁled ﬁrst in
China. Virtually all of the shared patents are ﬁled ﬁrst in China.
We ﬁrst compare the shared patents with exclusive patents owned by Chinese ﬁrms. To
construct the latter set, we begin with patents ﬁrst ﬁled in China and then remove any remaining
patents of large multinational ﬁrms, as well as patents of academic institutions.25 We can see in
Table 1 that 4.7 percent of exclusive Chinese ﬁrm patents subsequently go outside of China. Note
23 Publication of a patent application is an intermediate stage between the application for a patent and the grant
of a patent. Some applications are withdrawn before the publication stage.
24 A WIPO application standardizes the process of applying for patent protection in multiple countries.
25 We also manually process large patenters to eliminate patents in which the applicants are individuals rather
than ﬁrms.
11that the set of Chinese ﬁrm applicants as a whole includes many small ﬁrms. To obtain a group of
Chinese applicants that is more comparable in size to our sample of 114 large foreign multinational
ﬁrms, we select the top 100 Chinese applicants by counts of patents. We ﬁnd that 16.5 percent
of patents of large Chinese patenters subsequently go outside. Note the sharp diﬀerences here. If
a large Chinese ﬁrm has its name on an exclusive patent—that is, one not shared with a foreign
multinational—then 16.5 percent of the time it has its name on a corresponding patent outside of
China. If ownership is shared, however, the probability drops to 0.2 percent.
Next we look at the patents of our sample of large foreign multinationals that are ﬁrst ﬁled in
China. There are 12,446 of these patents, and 10.1 percent subsequently go outside—about seven
times higher than the rate for the shared patents. In addition to conditioning on patents ﬁrst ﬁled in
China, we can further condition on whether the applicant name ﬁeld speciﬁes a Chinese subsidiary
of the multinational and whether the set of inventors includes at least one with a Chinese name.
In this way, we focus on technology of the foreign multinational in cases with the inventive activity
likely occurring in China. The results are similar. Comparing exclusive and shared patents, the
rates of subsequently going outside are 10.6 and 2.0 percent, respectively, so again, we see a sharp
diﬀerence.
In our earlier discussion we highlighted the automotive industry, and Panel B of Table 1
presents results speciﬁcally for this case. Twelve foreign multinationals produce automobiles in
China, and all of them do so through joint ventures with one or more of seven major Chinese auto
companies.26 Rows 1 and 2 of Panel B correspond to the Chinese patents owned by multinationals
that are, respectively, shared and exclusive, with their Chinese partners. As in Panel A, it is evident
that shared patents stay inside China, whereas the exclusive patents go outside. The remaining
two rows of Panel B correspond to exclusive patents owned by domestic Chinese ﬁrms. In row
3 are exclusive patents owned by the seven ﬁrms with foreign partners (the joint venture ﬁrms);
in row 4 are exclusive patents owned by the six main independent automakers.27 The Chinese
ﬁrms with joint ventures have exclusive ownership of very few patents (less than one-third of what
the independents own), even though they outproduce the independents by a factor of four. This
fact makes clear that the joint-venture Chinese ﬁrms obtain their technology mainly from foreign
partners.
26 The twelve foreign companies are Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, Ford, Volkswagen, General Motors, Mazda,
Daimler, Suzuki, Peugeot Citroen, and BMW. The seven Chinese automakers that operate through joint
venture are SAIC, Dongfeng, FAW, Changan, BAIC, GAC, and Brilliance. The separate appendix in Holmes,
McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) provides further details.
27 These are Great Wall, Chery, Geely, JAC, BYD, and Lifan. We restrict attention to those automakers that
produced 200,000 or more units in 2012. See Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2013) for further details.
123.3. Countries Are Not All Alike: Technological Leaders and Laggards
The concept of technology capital in McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) is broad, including
high-tech intangible capital such as R&D in advanced communications and electronics, and low-
tech intangible capital such as brands of restaurants and hotel chains. The strategic plan laid out
in China State Council (2006) for indigenous innovation is clearly aimed at high-tech capital rather
than low-tech, and we expect the burden of technology transfer requirements for market access to
fall more heavily on high-tech ﬁrms compared with low-tech ﬁrms. Since countries diﬀer in the
degree to which their ﬁrms tend to be high-tech, we expect technology transfer requirements to be
more burdensome for some countries than others. This expectation motivates us to allow China’s
policy parameters in our model to vary across countries doing FDI in China.
Historically, the United States, Europe, and Japan have been recognized as the world leaders
in high-tech innovation. Table 2 presents evidence on diﬀerences in the degree of high-technology
across countries. Note that in the table we use the same country groupings that we will use later
in our quantitative model. Speciﬁcally, we group China with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao;
we group countries of Western Europe; we group the three large emerging economies of Brazil,
Russia, and India (BRI); and we group non-Caribbean countries not elsewhere listed that had
foreign direct investments in China in excess of 0.1 billion U.S. dollars in 2007 and call them rest
of world (ROW).28
The ﬁrst statistic we report in Table 2 is the triadic patent count measure developed by the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and we report these counts
on a per capita basis (per million in population).29 A triadic patent is one that has been granted
by each of the patent oﬃces in the United States, the European Union, and Japan. Restricting
attention to innovations that have been brought into these three main innovation markets selects
the most signiﬁcant innovations and addresses a home bias problem.30 The table makes it clear
that the three innovation centers are the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; they are very
diﬀerent from the rest, with triadic patent rates of 49.1, 36.3, and 117.0, compared with only 3.5
for ROW and 0.1 for both China and BRI.31 We can use another measure of knowledge and see
the same qualitative pattern. In a recent report, the National Science Foundation (NSF, 2012)
28 Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Rest of world
includes Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, Samoa, Saudi Ara-
bia, Singapore, and Thailand. In our baseline model, we exclude inward FDI from Caribbean countries because
these ﬂows are primarily related to sheltering taxes. In our sensitivity analysis, we change regional assignments
by adding net inﬂows from the Caribbean islands and including Korea with Japan rather than with ROW.
29 See Dernis and Khan (2004) for a discussion of the methodology.
30 Inventors with relatively unimportant ideas may obtain a patent in their home country but ignore other
countries. Triadic patents are for ideas that are evidently important enough to be brought to at least two
outside markets.
31 Note that we use year 2000, which is the midpoint of the 1990–2010 sample period we use when assessing our
quantitative model.
13classiﬁes certain industries as knowledge-intensive services and high-technology manufacturing.32
For the year 2000, we show in Table 2 that the United States leads with a 36.3 percent knowledge-
and technology-intensive share of GDP, and Western Europe and Japan come in next at around 28
percent. ROW is lower at 25 percent, and China and BRI are at the bottom, around 20 percent.
Based on these facts, in our quantitative model, we will assume that China has one set of
policy parameters for the high-tech countries, namely, the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan, and another set of parameters for the rest of the world.
4. Theory
The model is an extension of McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010) that includes the QPQ mech-
anism and the choice of an intensity level with which to deploy technology capital in a particular
market. We work with an aggregate production function, derived by aggregating ﬁrst across plants
and then across companies. The aggregate technologies are embedded in a multicountry general
equilibrium model with two types of ﬁrms: multinationals that have technology capital that is
nontransferred and appropriators that have technology capital that has been transferred to them
through QPQ arrangements.
4.1. Multinational Problem
Consider the problem of a multinational with nontransferred technology capital that chooses the
scale of overseas operations to maximize the present value of after-tax worldwide dividends,
max
 
t
pt (1 − τdt)D
j
t,
where t indexes time, j indexes the country where the multinational is incorporated, pt is the
Arrow-Debreu price, τd is the tax rate on shareholder dividends, and Dj is the aggregate dividend
payment.
The aggregate dividend payment for multinational ﬁrm j is the sum of dividends across FDI
host countries i = 1,...,I,
D
j
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(1 − τp,it)
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I,it − χ
j
iX
j
M,t
 
− K
j
T,i,t+1 + K
j
T,it
 
(4.1)
with χ
j
j = 1 and χ
j
i = 0 if i  = j. The dividend from country i is computed as the after-tax
accounting proﬁt less retained earnings. The tax rate in country i is given by τp,i. This tax is
assessed on the taxable proﬁt, which is equal to output Y
j
i less payments to labor L
j
i at rate Wi,
32 See the note to Table 2.
14depreciation of tangible capital K
j
T,i at rate δT, new investment in intangible capital X
j
I,i that is
speciﬁc to a location (that is, a plant in country i), and investment at home in new technology
capital X
j
M that, when accumulated, is intangible capital that can be used simultaneously in
multiple locations across the globe. When computing proﬁts, investments in tangible capital are
treated as capital expenditures, implying that the ﬁrm subtracts only the depreciation allowance,
whereas investments in the two intangible capitals are treated as expenses and therefore fully
subtracted. This diﬀerential treatment, in turn, implies that retained earnings recorded by the
accountants are net investment in tangible capital, which is given by K
j
T,i,t+1 − K
j
T,it between
period t and t + 1.
In each period t, total output produced by multinationals from j in host country i is given by
Y
j
it = Aitσ
j
it
 
q
j
itM
j
itNit
 φ  
Z
j
it
 1−φ
(4.2)
Z
j
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j
T,it
 αT 
K
j
I,it
 αI 
L
j
it
 1−αT −αI
, (4.3)
which is the production function derived by aggregating across plants and across companies. This
aggregate production function depends on the host country’s TFP denoted by Ait and its degree
of openness to FDI denoted by σ
j
it, which is equal to 1 if j = i and σit ∈ [0,1) if j  = i. We view
the TFP and openness parameters as government policies taken as given by multinationals when
deciding how much FDI to do in country i. Given these policies, multinationals in j choose how
much of their available technology capital, denoted by M
j
i , to deploy in country i. This is the
nontransferred stock of capital.
The stock of technology capital M
j
i can be used nonrivalrously, but it is indexed by the FDI
host country i, since FDI host countries diﬀer in their QPQ policies; companies may have less
available technology capital to use in countries that require QPQ than in countries that do not
if technology transfers have already taken place. Furthermore, because of QPQ requirements,
we assume that countries may choose to deploy less technology capital than is available. At the
aggregate level, the fraction of technology capital deployed in country i by companies in j is denoted
q
j
i—which we refer to as the intensity level—and the total eﬀective stock of technology capital is
therefore q
j
iM
j
i , with q
j
i ∈ [0,1] and qi
i = 1.
Country i has a total of Ni locations in which to operate, and like TFP and FDI openness, we
treat this as a characteristic of the country that is taken as given by multinationals. McGrattan
and Prescott (2009, 2010) use the concept of locations to account for diﬀerences in scale across
countries, and we follow that convention here by assuming in the quantitative analysis that a
country’s count of locations is proportional to its population size. The number of locations is
important for the concept of equilibrium used here, since technology capital is nonrivalrous and
is used simultaneously at multiple locations (or equivalently for multiple people). The rivalrous
15factors of production appear in the composite input Z
j
i , namely, tangible capital K
j
T,i, intangible
capital that is location speciﬁc K
j
I,i, and the labor input L
j
i. If there are decreasing returns to the
rival factors at the plant level, then companies choose to split these factors evenly across available
locations Ni.
The ﬁrst innovation of our model, relative to McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010), is to
introduce the intensity choice q
j
i described above, for the level at which technology capital is
deployed, location by location. To get back to McGrattan and Prescott, we can just assume that
intensity choices are ﬁxed at the upper bound of one, that is, q
j
i = 1 for all i,j.
The second innovation of our model is to incorporate QPQ policy. When a multinational from
j chooses to deploy technology capital in i at time t at intensity q
j
it, a share h
j
it(q
j
it) ∈ [0,1] of the
technology capital must be transferred to a local ﬁrm (the appropriator). Next period technology
capital is given by
M
j
i,t+1 = (1 − δM)
 
1 − h
j
it
 
q
j
it
  
M
j
it + X
j
M,t, (4.4)
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is undepreciated capital less technology transfers and
the second term is the new technology capital. Notice that the property rights being transferred
are speciﬁc to the destination country i, an assumption that we motivated earlier with the patent
data.33 We assume that the function h
j
it( ) is weakly increasing in the intensity choice q
j
it and is
weakly convex. The fact that it is upward sloping captures the terms of the quid pro quo—the
more technology capital brought in, the greater the required transfer. The convexity assumption
captures the idea that a ﬁrm might be able to get away with transferring small (perhaps less
important) ideas when the request for market access is low, protecting the most advanced and
important ideas (sometimes called the “crown jewels”) by keeping them at home. Large market
access, however, might come only at the price of the crown jewels.34
In terms of the interpretation of the function h
j
i(q), we think of it as broadly capturing the
kinds of policies discussed in Section 3, such as forced joint ventures. The special case of h(q) = q
has a particularly simple interpretation, namely that any capital deployed in the current period is
transferred to domestic ﬁrms for future periods. As an example, the German company Siemens
had a joint venture with China National Rail (CNR) that completed China’s ﬁrst high-speed rail
line in 2008. The next line was built by CNR, with only a minor role for Siemens (see USITC,
2010, pp. 4–11).
Two additional capital accumulation equations are needed to complete the description of the
33 If h
j
it(q
j
it) is equal to zero for all i, j, and t, then M
j
it = M
j
t does not depend on the host country as in the
McGrattan-Prescott model.
34 An alternative structure that would produce similar results would have a proportional QPQ tax and curvature
in the decision problem through a location-level setup cost that is convex in the intensity choice.
16multinational’s problem, namely,
K
j
T,i,t+1 = (1 − δT)K
j
T,it + X
j
T,it
K
j
I,i,t+1 = (1 − δI)K
j
I,it + X
j
I,it,
where K
j
T,i and K
j
I,i are stocks of tangible and intangible capital, respectively, used by multination-
als from country j that are aggregates of capital allocated to speciﬁc locations in country i. New
investments are given by X
j
T,i and X
j
I,i, and the stocks depreciate at rates δT and δI, respectively,
for tangible and intangible capital. Note that QPQ transfers only show up in the accumulation
equation for technology capital, thereby implying an asymmetry between the location-speciﬁc cap-
ital stocks and the nonrivalrous technology capital.35
There are several noteworthy aspects of the multinational’s problem. First, given the non-
rivalrous nature of technology capital, multinationals will want to employ it in foreign countries,
even in the face of QPQ.36 This is true even in the special case of h(q) = q. The host government
appropriates, beginning tomorrow, everything coming in today. On the balanced growth path of
such an economy, optimal policy is to set q = 1, since 100 percent of the eﬀective technology cap-
ital is appropriated. It makes sense to bring everything in as soon as possible and collect proﬁts
today, rather than wait and incur depreciation and discounting. If instead, the QPQ function h(q)
is strictly convex, there is an incentive to smooth the deployment of an idea, and the optimal
intensity may be interior, q < 1. Furthermore, if the host country is growing rapidly, a ﬁrm may
set q < 1, to hold out for bigger returns on technology capital in future periods. Both of these
factors play a role in our quantitative analysis.
Another noteworthy aspect of the multinational’s problem is that policies of large host coun-
tries can have nonnegligible eﬀects on the investment decisions of multinationals. More precisely,
if a host country i is small (where Nit goes to zero relative to
 
i′ Ni′t), then the particular QPQ
parameters for host i will be irrelevant in technology capital investment decisions for multinational
ﬁrms. If, on the other hand, Nit makes up a non-negligible share of the world economy, its QPQ
policies feed back into the investment decisions of potential FDI investors. We will see this force
at work in our quantitative analysis.
35 For some parameterizations of our model, nonnegativity constraints bind for investments, especially initial
investment of technology capital of countries that obtain capital through QPQ. To prevent nonnegative invest-
ments, we include a small subsidy for investment in technology capital when levels fall close to zero. We also
include adjustment costs to avoid large initial changes in investment along the transition path. The subsidy
and adjustment costs are chosen to be as small as possible to avoid violating the constraints. See Holmes,
McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) for details.
36 Production is Cobb-Douglas in nonrivalrous technology capital and rivalrous inputs. Therefore, the use of an
idea in a foreign country will always require local inputs. Nevertheless, because of the standard Inada condition,
it will always be optimal to bring in technology capital, regardless of the costs of rivalrous complementary
inputs.
174.2. Appropriator’s Problem
Appropriators also maximize the present after-tax discounted stream of dividends. Dividends
accruing to the transferred technology capital are given by
˜ Dit = (1 − τp,it)
 ˜ Yit − Wit˜ Lit − δT ˜ KT,it − ˜ XI,it
 
− ˜ KT,i,t+1 + ˜ KT,it. (4.5)
and are distributed to households in country i. Note that tildes are used to distinguish choices of
the appropriators in i from choices of the multinationals j operating in i. The relevant inputs for
the appropriators are the proﬁts tax rate τp,i, output ˜ Yi, payments to labor ˜ Li at wage rate Wi,
depreciation of tangible capital ˜ KT,i at rate δT, and new investment in plant-speciﬁc intangible
capital ˜ XI,i. The production technology in this case is
˜ Yit = Aitζ
 
˜ MitNit
 φ  
˜ Zit
 1−φ
(4.6)
˜ Zit =
 
˜ KT,it
 αT 
˜ KI,it
 αI 
˜ Lit
 1−αT −αI
, (4.7)
and the evolution of the capital stocks is given by
˜ Mi,t+1 = (1 − δM) ˜ Mit +
 
j
(1 − δM)h
j
it
 
q
j
it
 
M
j
it
˜ KT,i,t+1 = (1 − δT) ˜ KT,i,t+1 + ˜ XT,i,t+1
˜ KI,i,t+1 = (1 − δI) ˜ KI,i,t+1 + ˜ XI,i,t+1,
where ζ is the transfer TFP discount, ˜ Mi is transferred technology capital, and ˜ KT,i and ˜ KI,i
are rival tangible and intangible capital, respectively. Notice that appropriators do not make new
investments but rather are the recipients of technology capital from foreign multinationals (see
equation (4.4)).
Our general structure allows the production speciﬁcation for appropriators to diﬀer from
multinationals because of two factors that work in opposite directions. First, notice that in the
multinational production function (4.2), there are the parameters governing the degree of openness,
σ
j
it, and the intensity level of multinationals, q
j
it, whereas in the appropriator production function
(4.6), these parameters drop out, since both are at the upper bound equal to one. This aspect of
the formulation captures the advantage the appropriator has over a foreign ﬁrm in being immune
to obstacles that confront foreign ﬁrms. The appropriator need not worry about QPQ (and can
then set intensity to the upper bound of one). Also, it need not worry about general barriers
to foreigners, as captured in σ
j
it. Second, we introduce a transfer TFP discount term ζ ≤ 1 to
allow for the possibility that appropriators are less productive than the foreign multinational who
developed the technology being transferred. In the baseline quantitative model, we simplify by
focusing on the limiting case where ζ = 1, but then in Section 7 we consider ζ < 1.
18Although we have emphasized the quid pro quo nature of transfers, it is worth noting that
our general formulation includes outright expropriation as a special case. In particular, suppose
the QPQ function satisﬁes h
j
it(q
j
it) = ¯ h
j
it, which is invariant to a ﬁrm’s choice of intensity q
j
it. This
instance can be interpreted as a case of “quid” without the “quo,” where a government expropriates
technology capital at a ﬁxed level even if multinationals from i stay completely outside of j (that
is, even if q
j
it = 0).37 Faced with a constant quid pro quo function, it is immediate that foreign
ﬁrms will raise intensity to the maximum level, q = 1. In our quantitative model below, the
quid pro quo function is strictly upward sloping for a range of q, and we get an interior solution,
q < 1, for the advanced countries that brings technology to China. In other words, the advanced
countries endogenously hold back, and the key fact in the data that drives this result is the
diﬀerential FDI behavior between the advanced countries and the rest of the world. We note that
if we were to generalize the parameterization of the model to allow the openness parameter for
a destination country to vary across source countries, it is possible to ﬁt the same set of facts
with a perfectly ﬂat QPQ function. Formally, let ˆ q
j
it be the equilibrium intensity level in our
baseline model. Recall that σit is the openness parameter, which we have assumed to be speciﬁc
to the destination i but invariant to the source j. Call this the baseline model. Now consider
an alternative parameterization ˆ σ
j
it = σit(ˆ q
j
it)φ, with source-speciﬁc openness and assume a ﬂat
alternative QPQ function ˆ h
j
it(ˆ q
j
it) = ¯ h
j
it. This alternative yields the same outcomes as our baseline
model, with the diﬀerential FDI behavior now accounted for by exogenous diﬀerences in openness
across sources instead of diﬀerences in endogenous choices of q, as in the baseline. Although the
baseline model and the alternative ﬁt the same facts, we will see in Section 7 that they diﬀer in
their policy implications.
4.3. Household Problem
Households choose sequences of consumption Cit, labor Lit, and assets Bit+1 to solve the following
problem:
max
 
t
βt [log(Cit/Nit) + ψ log(1 − Lit/Nit)]Nit (4.8)
subject to
 
t
pt [Cit+Bi,t+1−Bit] ≤
 
t
pt[(1−τl,it)WitLit + (1−τdt)
 
Di
t + ˜ Dit
 
+rbtBit + κit], (4.9)
where τli and τd are tax rates on labor and company distributions, rb is the after-tax return on
international borrowing and lending, Nit is the population in country i (equivalent to the count
of locations as discussed earlier), and κit is exogenously determined income, which includes both
37 Note, however, that it might be diﬃcult for a country to absorb foreign technology without the cooperation of
foreign ﬁrms. That is, outright expropriation may be infeasible. Instead, we might see negotiated arrangements,
in which foreign ﬁrms agree to transfer technology in return for a reward such as market access.
19government transfers and nonbusiness net income.38 We include nonbusiness net income because
we want to match accounts of the model to accounts in the data and, therefore, want to distinguish
value added and investment from business and nonbusiness sectors. We also include nonbusiness
labor as part of the total labor input, and this too is exogenously set. Public consumption is
included with Ci.
4.4. Market Clearing
The worldwide resource constraint is
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, (4.10)
which is the market-clearing condition for the goods market that includes nonbusiness output ¯ Ynb,it
and nonbusiness investment ¯ Xnb,it. Recall that these are components of nonbusiness net income
for households, which is included in κit in (4.9).
Market clearing in asset markets occurs if
 
i Bit = 0, and market clearing in labor markets
occurs if
Lit =
 
j
L
j
it + ˜ Lit + ¯ Lnb,it, i = 1,...,I,
where L
j
it is the labor input for multinationals from j operating in country i, ˜ Lit is the labor input
of appropriators in country i, and ¯ Lnb,it is the time devoted to nonbusiness work.
Note that because there is only a single consumption good, there is no two-way trade in goods
with a period between countries. In general, however, there exists intertemporal trade in goods
across countries.
4.5. Accounting Measures
To compare our theory with national and international data, we ﬁrst need to construct the same
accounting statistics for our model that are produced for the national accounts and the balance
of payments. In particular, for our quantitative analysis, we need GDP, inward FDI, and outward
FDI.
GDP may be computed in two ways: by summing products or by summing incomes. For
country i, summing products yields
GDPit = Cit +
 
j
X
j
T,it + ˜ XT,it + ¯ Xnb,it + NXit, (4.11)
38 In our later application, we assume that some countries face borrowing constraints and impose these constraints
when computing equilibria.
20where NXit is net exports of goods and services by country i. Notice that intangible investments
are not included here because they are expensed and thus not part of value added.39
If GDP is found by summing incomes, we add together wages WiLi, total before-tax proﬁts
of multinationals with nontransferred capital operating in the country
 
j(Y
j
i − WiL
j
i − δTK
j
T,i −
X
j
I,i)−Xi
M, total before-tax proﬁts of appropriators ˜ Yi−Wi˜ Li−δT ˜ KT,i− ˜ XI,i, tangible depreciation
of all businesses
 
j δTK
j
T,i+δT ˜ KT,i, and capital income less investment for the nonbusiness sector,
¯ Ynb,i − Wi¯ Lnb,i − ¯ Xnb,i:
GDPit =
 
j Y
j
it + ˜ Yit + ¯ Ynb,it −
 
j X
j
I,it − Xi
M,t − ˜ XI,it. (4.12)
In equilibrium, it must be the case that the right-hand side of (4.11) equals the right-hand side of
(4.12). Equating the two and summing across countries yields the worldwide resource constraint
in (4.10).
Inward and outward FDI are items in the ﬁnancial accounts of the balance of payments. For
the model, the ﬁnancial account for country i is
FAit =
 
l =i
 
Ki
T,l,t+1 − Ki
T,lt
 
−
 
l =i
 
Kl
T,i,t+1 − Kl
T,it
 
+ Bit+1 − Bit, (4.13)
where the ﬁrst term is FDI by multinationals from i operating abroad (outward FDI), the second
term is the negative of new investment by foreigners operating in i (inward FDI), and the third
term is new portfolio acquisitions by households from i. For the accounts to balance, the ﬁnancial
account has to equal the current account, which is the sum of net exports and net factor payments
(receipts less payments). Net factor payments are the sum of dividends, retained earnings, and
interest income from abroad net of similar payments to other countries.
5. A Multicountry Application
Next, we describe our strategy for parameterizing the model. We also investigate the model’s ﬁt
and its implications for the global distribution of technology capital.
5.1. Model Parameters
As we noted earlier, the country groupings used here are a combined entity we call China (which
includes mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao), the United States, Western Europe,
Japan, a combined entity consisting of Brazil, Russia, and India (BRI), and a combined entity of
other countries that do signiﬁcant FDI in China, which we refer to as rest of world.40
39 The data we use do not include intellectual property products recently introduced in some national accounts.
40 We choose 1990 as our starting point because it is before the signiﬁcant rise in Chinese inward FDI. We include
BRI as a comparison with China and its provinces because they share many similarities in 1990. For details
on country groupings, see note 28.
21We assume that countries diﬀer in their QPQ policy (h
j
it(q)), level of TFP (Ait), degree of FDI
openness (σit), population size (Nit), and tax policy related to business proﬁts (τpi).41 In all other
respects, they are assumed to be the same and, therefore, we use common parameters for household
preferences (β, ψ), trend growth in TFP (1 + γA)t, trend growth in population (1 + γN)t, income
shares (φ,αT,αI), nonbusiness activities (¯ Lnb, ¯ Xnb/GDP, ¯ Ynb/GDP), depreciation rates (δM, δT,
δI), and tax rates on individual incomes (τl, τd). Speciﬁcally, we use estimates from McGrattan
and Prescott’s (2010) study of the U.S. current account, which are reported in Table 3, and show
separately in Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) that our main results are not sensitive to
these choices. Finally, for the baseline, we set the transfer TFP discount to ζ = 1.
Our model takes population and business tax rates as exogenous. Country populations are
reported in Table 4 for selected years (see Appendix A for data sources).42 We have data on
business tax levels, and for our baseline parameterization we hold the rates ﬁxed at their 1990
levels, which, in percentage terms, equal 32.9, 38.6, 42.9, 50, 35, and 32.1 for China, the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, BRI, and ROW, respectively.43
In our model, GDP and FDI ﬂows are endogenous. We choose values for country TFPs, degrees
of openness, and QPQ, such that the equilibrium GDP levels and FDI ﬂows in the model match
their counterparts in the data.44 Our prior is that use of QPQ by the advanced countries—the
United States, Western Europe, Japan—is negligible, so we assume h
j
it(q) = 0, for i equal to the
index for these host countries, for all sources j. We assume China imposes QPQ on inward FDI from
the advanced countries but does not impose it on the rest of world countries. Section 3.3 presented
evidence that the United States, Europe, and Japan are very diﬀerent from the rest of the world
with respect to the high-tech nature of their research and patent activity. The advanced countries
have the frontier knowledge that China particularly desires to obtain, including technologies that
have military applications. The technology capital of the rest of the world, including brands of
restaurants and banks, tends to be relatively less technologically advanced. This motivates our
assumption that China’s QPQ policy concentrates on the advanced countries. Speciﬁcally, we
parameterize China’s QPQ policy to the advanced countries so that the share of inward FDI
41 We also assume diﬀerences in policies related to portfolio ﬂow restrictions because some of the countries in our
sample still have tight capital controls on portfolio investments. Speciﬁcally, for the baseline parameterization,
we assume that portfolio ﬂows are completely free in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan and
completely restricted elsewhere. As a check on this assumption, we consider an alternative version of the
model with free portfolio ﬂows across all countries. See Prasad and Wei (2007) for a nice survey of capital
controls in China and Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) for details on the alternative model.
42 The time period of the model is annual, but we choose the parameters to ﬁt trends in the data and, thus, only
report selected years in the input tables. Inputs for all years are reported in Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott
(2014).
43 In our sensitivity analysis, we feed in time-varying rates for China and ﬁnd that our results are robust to this
extension.
44 We do not model domestic policies that led to improvements in the technology parameters Ait—which may
include policies related to greater openness—but rather we treat these policies as exogenous. See Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), who investigate policies that aﬀect growth in
China’s productivity.
22coming from the advanced countries to China and its provinces has the same trend in the model
and the data.
We have no bilateral FDI ﬂows for the BRI countries. We need to make some assumptions
about BRI’s policy and for simplicity we treat BRI as having the same QPQ policy as China.
Furthermore, we assume that BRI imposes QPQ on China and vice versa. We experiment with
alternative assumptions, such as the assumption that BRI does not impose QPQ. Our results,
including the welfare eﬀects of China’s QPQ, are robust to these alternative assumptions. We
discuss these results further in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, we assume that the rest of world countries
do not impose QPQ.
The functional form for QPQ for hosts i that impose QPQ is given by
h
j
it (q) = min{¯ htq exp(−η (1 − q)),1}, (5.1)
which is weakly increasing in q. The choice of this functional form is motivated by the fact that we
need some curvature in the function (that is, η > 0) in order for an interior equilibrium to exist. In
our baseline model, we set η = 10 and check to make sure that the results are robust to a range of
values for η.45 We leave the path of ¯ ht as a sequence of free parameters and interpret the changes
in these parameters over time as changes in policy. A higher value of ¯ ht is associated with higher
QPQ transfer rates.46
Smooth sequences for {Ait,σit,¯ ht}, i = 1,...,6, are chosen to ﬁt trends in real per capita
GDP for the six economies, inward FDI to the six economies, and the share of FDI coming to
China from the advanced countries. That is, we set paths for the thirteen parameter sequences
so that the model generates the same trends as our thirteen observed series. In Tables 5 and 6,
we report the inputs for TFPs, openness, and QPQ costs needed to match these trends in the
data. Parameters in the top panel of Table 5 are the total factor productivities (Ait). Trends in
real GDP are especially sensitive to changes in TFP choices. Notice that matching observations
requires a large increase in China’s TFP. For Western Europe and BRI, there was little catch-up
to U.S. levels, and thus we have nearly constant TFP paths. Japan actually experienced a decline
in relative TFPs. The bottom panel of Table 5 shows the degree of openness parameters (σit).
Trends in observed inward FDI are especially sensitive to changes in the inputs for the degree of
openness. Japan stays relatively closed to FDI throughout the period. China and BRI, on the
other hand, become much more open.
45 What matters are the paths of the equilibrium intensity levels and QPQ costs, which in turn determine the
share of FDI coming to China from advanced countries. To match this share, we need to vary the path of ¯ ht
as we vary the elasticity η.
46 Section 7 considers variations in the baseline model including one with ﬁxed QPQ policy. In this case, with
¯ ht constant, the model cannot generate the full drop in the share shown in Figure 5, but the main results
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the baseline, because China’s large rise in TFP plays a central role for the
equilibrium choice of intensity level.
23In Table 6 we report the equilibrium values of the transfer rates, that is, h
j
it(q), that result
from the QPQ policy. (We report these values because their economic magnitudes are more readily
interpretable than the values of the ¯ ht parameters.) To match the bilateral ﬂows, the QPQ transfer
rates faced in China by multinationals from the advanced countries must have grown. For example,
in 1990, multinationals are transferring technology capital to China at a rate of 0.2 percent per
year. This rate rises to 4.4 percent per year by 2010. We have not modeled the choice of policy by
the Chinese government, but it is intuitive that the vast expansion of the Chinese market gives it
more bargaining power.
5.2. Model Fit
In Figures 3–5, we display the implied model outputs along with their empirical analogues. We
make several adjustments to GDP and FDI data to facilitate comparisons between the model and
the data. First, we divide the per capita GDPs for all countries by U.S. per capita GDP; this step
allows us to normalize A1t to 100 for all t without loss of generality. The results for real per capita
GDP are shown in Figure 3. Second, we cumulate the inward FDI over time because there are
large ﬂuctuations in the year-by-year investments. We then deﬂate these investments, which are in
nominal terms, and detrend them by dividing by population and the common world growth trend
in technology. In order to facilitate comparison, we divide the series for cumulated FDI relative to
trend by the value for China in 2010 (which is shown in Figure 1). Inward FDI ﬂows for the model
and data are shown in Figure 4. The parameters of the baseline model are chosen with the goal of
ﬁtting these targets, and the resulting ﬁt is very good.
The ﬁnal target to consider is the share of inward FDI coming from the advanced countries to
China. Figure 5 shows the ﬁt of the baseline model to this target. The data series in Figure 5 is
derived by taking the ratio of inward FDI from advanced nations in Figure 1 and dividing by the
total inward FDI. The same time series is constructed for the model economy. Again, the model
economy ﬁts the target well.
In our procedure, we did not target China’s outward FDI ﬂows. We next examine how the
baseline model ﬁts this additional aspect of the data, which provides an external check of the
framework. Speciﬁcally, we construct cumulated outward ﬂows in an analogous way to the inward
FDI series shown in Figure 5: we take the ratio of cumulated FDI from China—in particular, the
cumulation of ﬂows shown in Figure 2—relative to trend GDP, where trend GDP is China’s GDP in
1990 times the common growth trend. The series for the model and data are normalized by China’s
cumulative inward FDI relative to trend GDP in 2010 (as we did in Figure 5). The results are
displayed in Figure 6. The baseline model ﬁts this nontargeted aspect of the data relatively well.
In the data, China’s cumulated outward FDI by 2010 is roughly 40 percent of China’s cumulated
24inward FDI. The baseline model predicts this statistic to be around 50 percent, only slightly higher
than the actual level.
For the sake of comparison, we have also considered ﬁtting a restricted model in which QPQ
policy by China (and BRI) is set to zero. For this limiting case, the model reduces to that in
McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010).47 Figure 6 shows the predicted FDI outﬂows from China
for this restricted model, in addition to the baseline. Unlike the baseline model, the restricted
model with no QPQ ﬁts the data poorly, overpredicting actual outﬂows by a factor of ﬁve.48
Without QPQ transfers, Chinese ﬁrms must develop their own technologies, but if they do, they
can take these technologies abroad, and that is why predicted outﬂows of this model are so large.
With QPQ, Chinese ﬁrms tend to obtain technology in the form of transfers, which by contract
they are unable to take outside of China.
In Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014), we demonstrate that the results in Figure 6
for the restricted model without QPQ are little changed even if we allow for a more ﬂexible
speciﬁcation of FDI openness in which σ
j
it is indexed by the source and destination pair (i,j). This
generalization allows for a broader interpretation of the costs of FDI, which may be signiﬁcant when
host countries are distant or have languages diﬀerent from the source country. These country-pair
speciﬁc discounts are often highlighted in the literature (see, for example, Keller and Yeaple, 2013,
and Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare, 2013). If we have complete freedom to set the paths σ
j
it for all
i, j, and t in arbitrary ways, we can ﬁt any bilateral capital ﬂows. Instead, we assume that there
exists a discount ξ < 1 on the ability to transfer technology capital between one group of countries
that are close in terms of geography or language and the remaining countries. Speciﬁcally, we
replace σit with ˜ σ
j
it = ξσit if i and j are not close and ˜ σ
j
it = σit if i and j are close. Leaving ξ
constant over time is appropriate to the extent that it is based on distance and language diﬀerences
that are constant over time. In setting σ
j
it, we assume that the United States and Western Europe
are close and that the remaining—mostly Asian—countries are close. We also vary ξ and recalibrate
the parameters discussed in Section 5.1 in order to match Figures 3 and 4 as before. We show
that allowing for ξ < 1 in the model without QPQ makes no headway in ﬁtting the pattern of the
declining share of FDI from the technologically advanced countries into China and little headway
in accounting for the low outﬂows of FDI from China shown in Figure 6.
In our procedure, we did not attempt to target direct measures of technological capital or
transfers thereof. Measuring intangibles such as technological capital can be diﬃcult. Nevertheless,
47 TFP and openness parameters are chosen so as to match Figures 3 and 4. See Holmes, McGrattan, and
Prescott (2014) for details of the model inputs for the restricted model without QPQ.
48 Both versions of the model predict that bilateral outward ﬂows from China are roughly proportional to GDPs
in recipient countries, which leads to an overprediction of the fraction of China’s outﬂows that go to techno-
logically advanced countries. Adding a preferential bias for goods from countries in similar income groups as
in Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011) would help along this dimension.
25if we can treat counts of new patents as a proxy for inﬂows of technological capital, we can use the
earlier patent data to make some suggestive calculations related to goodness of ﬁt.
Speciﬁcally, we use the patent data in Table 1 from the automobile industry, and we examine
the consistency of this data with our estimate of the equilibrium transfer rate from QPQ, which
we denote here by hc(qc). Let
 
j =c M
j
ct be the total foreign multinational technology capital in
China at time t, and let
 
j =c p
j
ct be the number of new patents at time t of the multinationals.
Assuming a proportional factor ϕ between Chinese patents and new units of technology capital,
the stock of multinational technology capital evolves according to
 
j
M
j
c,t+1 = (1 − δM)(1 − hc (qc))
 
j
M
j
ct + ϕ
 
j
p
j
ct.
Note that we are assuming that qc is the same for all foreign multinationals in China. The
technology capital transferred in period t equals
ϕpT
ct = (1 − δM)hc (qc)
 
j
M
j
ct.
In a steady state,
 
j M
j
ct grows at the rate of total output γY . Using this fact and taking ratios,
we can eliminate
 
j M
j
ct and obtain the following equation for the ratio of transferred patents to
patents by multinationals:
pT
ct  
j p
j
ct
=
(1 − δM)hc (qc)
1 + γY − (1 − δM)(1 − hc (qc))
.
If we substitute an estimate of the ratio of patent counts, and if we substitute the depreciation rate
δM = 0.08, and the growth rate of output γY = 0.03 from the model, we can back out hc(qc) and
check its consistency with our estimates. We consider two estimates for the patent ratio. In the ﬁrst,
we treat all patents of Chinese ﬁrms with joint venture partners as transferred. In this case, the
ratio of patent counts is 1,078/14,500, and our estimate of the QPQ transfer rate is hc(qc) = 0.01.
Suppose next that even the independent ﬁrms take technology from the multinationals.49 If we
include both the independent and joint venture ﬁrm patents as transferred, then the ratio of patent
counts is 4,355/14,500, and the estimate of the QPQ transfer rate is hc(qc) = 0.051. These rough
calculations yield a range of estimates that brackets the estimates in Table 6 in 1995 and beyond
for the equilibrium QPQ transfer rate.50
49 One example is based on a lawsuit ﬁled by General Motors against the independent ﬁrm Chery Automo-
bile Company, claiming the Chery QQ was a clone of GM’s Chevrolet Spark. According to news reports,
analysts projected that “the QQ will not be sold in the United States, owing to the G.M. litigation” (see
Chris Buckley, “Enter the Chinese Dragon, Now Bearing Minicars,” New York Times, January 7, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/07/business/worldbusiness/07auto.html? r=0).
50 If we use the second half of the sample, with patents published during 2008–2010, the estimated range is
[.014,.09].
265.3. The Global Distribution of Technology Capital
We now use the model to examine how the global distribution of technology capital has changed
over time. In Table 7 we report each country’s share of the world’s accumulated nontransferred
technology capital (Mi
i/
 
i Mi
i). Note that China lags behind all other countries including BRI.
The model predicts that in 1990, China’s nontransferred technology capital level was tiny, a 0.1
percent share. By 2010, its world share of nontransferred technology capital had increased 60-fold,
to 6.1 percent. Nevertheless, this amount is still less than half of Japan’s level, even though China’s
total GDP is larger than Japan’s in 2010. Although the United States, Western Europe, and Japan
have lost ground over the period, together they still account for more than 70 percent of world
technology capital in 2010.
Table 8 compares nontransferred and transferred capital-output ratios for China and BRI, the
two regions that require QPQ transfers in the model. For both regions, the ratio of transferred
capital to GDP is much larger than the ratio of nontransferred capital to GDP. In 1990, technology
capital transfer to China is roughly 0.83 times GDP from foreigners doing FDI in China. This
ratio falls with the rapid growth in China’s GDP, but by 2010 the transferred capital stock is still
large relative to the capital accumulated by Chinese multinationals, by roughly a factor of 2 (or
0.35/0.16). The trends in these ratios are less dramatic in BRI because these countries did not
grow as rapidly as China over the period. BRI’s transferred capital stock is 0.49 in 1990 and falls
to 0.30 in 2010.
Having ﬁrst looked at the technology capital-output ratios of China and BRI in Table 8, we
next examine the two margins that aﬀect inﬂows of technology capital into China and BRI from
the advanced countries. The ﬁrst margin is the intensity margin q shown in the ﬁrst and third
columns of Table 9. Without the QPQ tax, ﬁrms set q = 1. With QPQ, ﬁrms from the advanced
countries set q substantially less than one in all years. This intensity level increases and then
decreases. For example, in the case of FDI in China, the intensity level increases from 0.21 to 0.41
over the years 1990–2000, reﬂecting the growth in productivity that increases the incentives to
bring in technology capital. The decline from 0.41 to 0.35 over the period 2000–2010 stems from
the increase in the QPQ tax schedule, which is consistent with the time pattern of the share of
inﬂows to China from the advanced countries.
A second margin at play—the extensive margin—is the volume of the technology capital from
advanced countries that is not yet transferred. In the second and fourth columns of Table 9, we
report the share of technology capital that is not yet transferred, that is,
 
j M
j
it/( ˜ Mit +
 
j M
j
it),
where the j in the sums are the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, and i is either China
or BRI. This measure reﬂects the share of knowledge that foreign ﬁrms still have available for
use in China or BRI, which, along with the intensive margin, is a key determinant of FDI ﬂows.
Note, in particular, the results in the second column of Table 9. The share of technology capital
27not transferred from advanced countries to China fell from 86 percent to 77 percent between 2000
and 2010, a decline of 9 percentage points. This decline reﬂects the cumulative eﬀect of transfers
taking place over the decade. Thus, the cumulative transfer channel is a signiﬁcant part of the
story of what happened to inﬂows from the advanced nations to China over the period, working
in the same direction as the intensity channel. The same is true for BRI.
In this section, we have used observed patterns of growth and international capital ﬂows to
pin down the model’s parameters and from there have examined properties of the model economy.
We turn next to policy analysis.
6. Policy Analysis
In this section, we use our quantitative model to study the eﬀects of quid pro quo policy. As
our baseline, we use the model calibrated to the actual policy choices derived in the previous
section. We simulate the eﬀects of counterfactual alternative policy choices beginning in 1991,
comparing transitions from the same initial state in 1990. We examine how alternative policies
aﬀect the welfare of the various countries, determine the quantity of technology capital created
by the various countries, and identify which countries own the technology capital and where they
use it. The ﬁrst part of this section considers the eﬀects of unilateral changes in QPQ by China.
The second part compares QPQ with a tax on proﬁts. The third part evaluates the eﬀects of
multilateral changes in QPQ policy.
6.1. Unilateral Changes in China’s Quid Pro Quo
Our ﬁrst exercise examines the consequences of China’s elimination of QPQ beginning 1991. For-
mally, assume h
j
ct(q) = 0 in China for all source countries j, with all other policy choices remaining
at the baseline settings. The policy change is unanticipated, so the initial state variables in 1990
for the counterfactual exercise are the same as in the baseline. Panel A of Table 10 presents the
results. In the ﬁrst row, we report the welfare eﬀects of the actual policy relative to the alternative.
The welfare measure is the percentage change in the path of consumption that would be necessary
to compensate individuals in the various countries under the counterfactual, in order to leave them
indiﬀerent to the actual policy.
For China, the welfare beneﬁt of the actual QPQ policy relative to eliminating it in 1991 is
equivalent to a 4.69 percent increase in consumption. This is a signiﬁcant welfare eﬀect and is to
be expected as a consequence of three key ﬁndings from Section 5. First, in the calibrated model,
the implied QPQ transfer rates are signiﬁcant. Second, a signiﬁcant fraction of technology capital
used in China is coming from the advanced countries. Based on these two results, we know that
high QPQ tax levels are being applied to a relatively large base, and we can expect China to
28beneﬁt in the usual way that a country levying a high tax on a large base can beneﬁt. The third
key result in the baseline model relevant here is that even though China has become more open in
recent years, signiﬁcant barriers to foreigners remain. In formal terms of the model, even by 2010,
the openness parameter is signiﬁcantly less than one, σc,2010 = 0.81. When technology capital is
transferred from a foreign ﬁrm to a domestic ﬁrm, barriers are overcome, which creates welfare
gains.
Although the actual QPQ policy is better for China than having no QPQ requirements, it is
not necessarily the best QPQ policy for China. Indeed, we have veriﬁed that China’s welfare is
strictly increasing in higher levels of QPQ, evaluated locally at the actual policy.51 This ﬁnding
is not surprising, because if we were to model China’s policy choice, we would take into account
an additional consideration left out of our model. In particular, at higher levels of QPQ, China
would have a harder time claiming that it is abiding by international agreements, and therefore
the likelihood of punitive sanctions would increase. Based on this consideration, we would expect
China’s QPQ level to be on the upward-sloping portion of a Laﬀer curve, and indeed that is the
case.
Next we consider the impact of China’s QPQ policy on the advanced nations. The eﬀect
on their welfare is obviously negative, since QPQ works like a tax imposed by China on these
countries. The magnitude of this impact depends on the importance of China as a destination
market for technology. If the Chinese market were negligible, the welfare eﬀect of any kind of
taxation for access to the Chinese market would be negligible. The signiﬁcant ﬁnding in Table 10
is that the Chinese market is now large enough such that the welfare eﬀect of China’s QPQ policy
is nonnegligible. In particular, the technologically advanced countries, namely, the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan, are harmed by China’s use of QPQ at rates in the range of −0.32 to
−0.45 percent of consumption.
In the second row of Panel A in Table 10, we report the nontransferred capital ratio, deﬁned as
the 2010 baseline level of technology capital stock developed by domestic ﬁrms, namely, Mi
i for all
i, relative to the stock under the alternative policy. We condition on the stock in the home country
because there are no QPQ requirements on domestic ﬁrms, and therefore the measure includes only
technology capital that is internally developed and does not include transfers through QPQ. In
the third row of Panel A in Table 10, we report the total capital ratio. This ratio sums transferred
and nontransferred capital in the home country for 2010, and analogously, takes the ratio under
the actual policy relative to the alternative policy. For the advanced countries, no transfers are
received in the actual or the alternative policy, so the nontransferred capital ratio is identical to
the total capital ratio. Examining these ratios for the advanced countries, we see that because of
China’s QPQ policy, technology capital stocks in the advanced countries are lower by 4 percent
51 We verify this by increasing the QPQ cost parameters by a small amount in all periods.
29or more. By 2010, China’s economy is large enough such that the eﬀective tax on multinational
technology capital investment through China’s QPQ policy signiﬁcantly aﬀects the incentives to
make these investments in the ﬁrst place.
Next we consider the eﬀects of QPQ on technology stocks in China. The nontransferred
capital ratio is only 0.43. That is, because of China’s QPQ policy, transferred capital substitutes
for nontransferred capital, and China accumulates nontransferred stocks at a rate that is less than
half of what it would be without QPQ. In contrast, the total capital ratio is 1.46. That is, when
we take into account transfers through QPQ, China ends up owning 50 percent more technology
capital in China by 2010 than it otherwise would. Note that rents from transferred capital are
already included in the welfare measure on the ﬁrst line in Panel A. However, suppose that beyond
these rents that are already accounted for, China obtains additional intangible beneﬁts from its
ownership of the technology capital used domestically. These beneﬁts might include those related
to the military and national defense or even beneﬁts simply related to national pride. Indeed,
China has articulated an explicit policy goal of having self-owned innovation, as discussed earlier
in Section 3. Our results show that China’s use of QPQ has furthered that aim.
The last issue to address in this ﬁrst exercise is what happens with BRI. For our baseline
model, we assume that BRI imposes the same QPQ policy as China. In the counterfactual, China
unilaterally eliminates QPQ, and BRI’s use of QPQ remains at the baseline level. We see in
Panel A of Table 10 that BRI is worse oﬀ when China also imposes QPQ because this policy
induces advanced nations to invest less technology capital, meaning that there is less for BRI to
appropriate. Note, however, that the particular assumptions we make regarding the QPQ policy
in the BRI countries is not important to our conclusions.
In Panel B of Table 10, we consider an alternative counterfactual, one in which both China
and the BRI eliminate QPQ beginning in 1991. The eﬀects on China’s welfare and capital stocks
are very similar to the original counterfactual in Panel A: the welfare gain of QPQ policy for China
is large, close to 4.4 percent, and the nontransferred capital ratio is small, about 0.44 percent.
The welfare losses to the advanced countries are about twice as large because both China and BRI
are large countries and have a signiﬁcant impact on global investment decisions. In Section 7, we
also consider an alternative economy in which BRI does not impose QPQ in the baseline or the
counterfactual, and we obtain results that are very similar to those shown in Panel A.
6.2. Comparison with a Tax on Proﬁts
In our baseline model, multinational ﬁrms from advanced nations face two diﬀerent taxes for bring-
ing technology capital to China. The ﬁrst, QPQ, is a tax paid in units of transferred technology
capital. The second, a tax on proﬁts, is levied on the proﬁts of foreign aﬃliates in China and
30paid in units of the consumption good. The proﬁts tax corresponds to parameter τp,it in equation
(4.1) and is set equal to 33 percent of proﬁts in the baseline model, as explained in Section 4.
In this subsection, we contrast the eﬀects of these two diﬀerent types of taxes. We consider an
experiment in which the tax on proﬁts for the advanced countries is set to zero beginning in 1991,
and we leave everything else, including QPQ, the same. Domestic ﬁrms are assumed to pay the
33 percent proﬁts tax, as are multinationals from other countries besides the advanced nations;
this assumption is held ﬁxed in the exercise. Thus, in our analysis, we are examining the eﬀects of
diﬀerentially changing the proﬁts tax rate faced by multinationals from the advanced nations. We
lower the tax to zero not because this rate corresponds to any actual policy under consideration
but rather to compare the eﬀects with the ﬁrst counterfactual that sets QPQ to zero. The exercise
helps to illuminate how the model works.52
The results of our exercise are tabulated in Panel C of Table 10. The welfare eﬀects of a proﬁts
tax (ﬁrst row of Panel C) have the same signs as the welfare eﬀects of QPQ (ﬁrst row of Panel
A). In particular, the countries that are subject to the tax lose under either type of tax, although
the magnitude of the QPQ eﬀects is on the order of three or four times the proﬁts tax eﬀects. For
example, under the baseline, the United States loses 0.18 percent in consumption compared with
the no proﬁts tax eﬀects, and loses 0.45 percent in consumption compared with the no QPQ eﬀects.
The taxing country gains: China’s gain is 1.0 percent from the tax on proﬁts and 4.7 percent from
QPQ. Finally, the remaining country groups, BRI and ROW, experience an indirectly negative
impact from either type of tax because of the negative impact on investment in technology capital
by advanced countries.
So far, our discussion has focused on the ways in which a tax on proﬁts and QPQ policy have
qualitatively similar eﬀects. We now direct the discussion to capital ratios in China, and here
policies are quite diﬀerent. Because of the proﬁts tax, nontransferred capital in China increases by
4 percent, substituting for declines in investment by the advanced countries. This result contrasts
with the QPQ policy, where nontransferred technology capital in China falls by more than half,
since transferred capital substitutes for nontransferred capital. Next, note that total technology
capital (which includes transfers) is higher by only 2 percent under a proﬁts tax but almost 50
percent higher with QPQ. That is, a tax on proﬁts does not contribute to China’s goal of self-owned
innovation in the same way that QPQ does.53
52 Note, however, that China actually lowered tax rates on the proﬁts of foreign ﬁrms as an incentive for companies
to invest in China. We discuss the details further in Section 7.
53 Another diﬀerence is found in predicted capital ﬂows. Assuming that China is only taxing foreign aﬃliate
proﬁts and not implementing a QPQ policy, the model overpredicts outward FDI ﬂows as shown in Figure 6.
316.3. Multilateral Changes in QPQ Policy
Countries have a unilateral incentive to impose at least some level of QPQ for the usual optimal
taxation considerations. In this ﬁnal subsection, we discuss the welfare eﬀects of multilateral
changes in QPQ policy. Although a country may beneﬁt from its own QPQ policy, it is harmed by
the QPQ i of other countries, and these oﬀsetting eﬀects may or may not cancel out each other.
Panel D of Table 10 tabulates the eﬀects of a counterfactual policy in which the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan all adopt the same QPQ policy as China, beginning in 1991. Notice the
negative signs on the welfare numbers for the three advanced economies, meaning that the baseline
yields lower returns than the counterfactual. That is, the advanced nations gain by multilaterally
initiating QPQ against each other and against China and BRI.
If we compare Panels B and D, however, we ﬁnd that the United States and Western Europe
have incentives to push for global investment agreements that limit the use of QPQ multilaterally.
To see this result, start with the welfare numbers in Panel B—a comparison of the baseline with
QPQ with the alternative without QPQ—and subtract the welfare numbers in Panel D—the base-
line relative to the alternative with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan also adopting
QPQ. The baseline cancels, and we are left with a comparison of two environments: one with
all countries (except ROW) employing QPQ and one with no countries employing QPQ. The net
welfare eﬀect for the United States equals −.96 − (−.74) = −.22. That is, the United States is
a net loser when QPQ is adopted in this broad multilateral fashion, as is Western Europe. In
contrast, the ﬁgures for China and BRI are 4.37 − 1.98 = 2.39 and 4.61 − 2.30 = 2.31, so both are
net winners. The intuition for the asymmetry is clear: China and BRI originate disproportionately
less technology capital than the advanced economies, so China and BRI do relatively better under
a regime in which technology capital is eﬀectively taxed through QPQ, even multilaterally. Since
the United States and Western Europe are net losers from multilateral QPQ, they push for limits
on the use of QPQ, such as those set by the WTO.
Finally, we note that the eﬀects of multilateral QPQ in Japan are quite diﬀerent from those
in the United States and Western Europe.54 This result arises from diﬀerences in the degree of
openness. In the model, for 2010, the degree of openness parameter for Japan (σit) is equal to
0.730 (as shown in Table 5) which is actually lower than China’s level (0.811) and signiﬁcantly
lower than the levels for the United States and Western Europe (0.870 and 0.858, respectively). If
Japan is able to appropriate foreign technology and operate it without these extensive barriers, it
obtains signiﬁcant welfare gains.
54 Japan is also quite diﬀerent from China because of its military alliance with the United States following World
War II. It is likely that some technology transfer, which is not modeled here, was needed to secure peace in
the Paciﬁc region.
327. Robustness
In Table 11, we investigate the sensitivity of our main results to alternative speciﬁcations of the
model. In each case, we reparameterize the model, following the method of Section 5, choosing
levels of TFPs, degrees of openness, and the QPQ parameters to match trends in real per capita
GDPs and inward FDI ﬂows. In all cases, we conﬁrm the main ﬁndings from the baseline model.
The ﬁrst alternative speciﬁcation allows for knowledge spillovers that depend on the level of
technology capital deployed within a country. The results are shown in the second column of Table
11 under the heading “Add Knowledge Spillovers.” As noted in Section 2, spillovers receive much
attention in discussions of the eﬀects of FDI, so it is useful to examine how incorporating spillovers
aﬀects our results. Formally, deﬁne µ
j
t as the total level of technology capital deployed in country
j from all sources,
µ
j
t = {M
j
jt + ˜ Mjt + σ
1
φ
jt
 
ℓ =j
qℓ
jtMℓ
jt}/(1 + γY )
t ,
where γY is the trend growth rate of output. Note that we are deﬁning this level as net of the
barrier σj faced by foreign ﬁrms and net of the intensity choice qj. Let the production function for
new technology capital be given by (µ
j
t)θX
j
M,t, which substitutes for X
j
M,t in equation (4.4). The
parameter θ governs the degree of spillover, and we get back to the baseline model with θ = 0.
For our robustness exercise, we set θ = .05, a signiﬁcant magnitude of spillover.55 Our results
with spillovers included are shown in the second column of Table 11. These results should be
compared with the baseline results in the ﬁrst column. Note that China’s implied share of 2010
world nontransferred capital is virtually the same with spillovers as in the baseline, 5.9 percent
versus 6.1 percent, whereas levels of technology capital (relative to GDP) are higher in the spillover
case. With spillovers, the price of investment decreases both inside and outside of China, and there
is little change in where innovation occurs, only in how much. Next, note at the bottom of Table 11
that the welfare eﬀects of unilateral QPQ by China are barely aﬀected by the inclusion of spillovers.
The second alternative speciﬁcation, shown in the third column of Table 11 and labeled “Trans-
fer TFP Discount,” allows for discounting to take place through the transfer process, that is, ζ < 1.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the view was that development of so-called third world countries could
be achieved by large transfers of technology from the ﬁrst world. In more recent decades, the
broadly recognized view is that local ﬁrms in developing countries may not have the capacity to
fully absorb transferred technologies (see UNCTAD, 2001, for a discussion). To incorporate this
force here, we consider a version of the model with ζ = 0.9, that is, a 10 percent TFP discount on
transfer. (Again, we reparameterize the rest of the model to match GDPs and FDI ﬂows.) Note
55 For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996), a classic reference on spillovers, estimates a spillover parameter of
approximately this magnitude. Quantifying knowledge spillovers continues to be an important area of research.
See, for example, Atkeson and Burstein (2011), research surveyed by Hale and Long (2012), and and the work
of Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013).
33in particular the policy results at the bottom of the table. Not surprisingly, transfer discounting
attenuates China’s welfare gain from unilateral use of QPQ. In fact, the welfare gain to China
is about 90 percent of the original welfare gain (4.24 versus 4.69). China does more of its own
research under QPQ in this speciﬁcation (the nontransferred capital ratio goes from 0.43 to 0.50),
because it appropriates less, net of the discount. But note that the counterfactual policy eﬀects
on U.S. research is unchanged compared with the baseline case. Although not reported here, the
story is similar for Western Europe and Japan. The welfare loss to the United States of China’s
unilateral use of QPQ is somewhat smaller in absolute value than in the baseline speciﬁcation.
(When appropriators are less productive, it works to the advantage of the foreign aﬃliates with
whom they compete.) Nevertheless, taking into account the productivity discounting from transfer
makes more of a diﬀerence for China than for the other countries.56
Our third alternative speciﬁcation follows up on our previous discussion on outright expro-
priation. In Section 4.2, we noted the equivalence in ﬁtting the facts between (i) our model with
an upward-sloping required transfer function h( ), and openness parameters σi,t that vary with
destination i but not source j, and (ii) an alternative version of the model with a perfectly ﬂat
required transfer function, and a generalization of the assumptions on the openness parameters ˆ σ
j
i,t
to allow them to vary with source. Although both versions are equivalent in ﬁtting the data, they
diﬀer in the policy consequences of setting the transfer function parameters to zero. The reason is
that in the baseline model, the intensity variable q changes, whereas in the alternative, it remains
ﬁxed. These diﬀerential eﬀects are seen by comparing the baseline case in the ﬁrst column of Table
11 with the case labeled “Theft and Disparate Openness” in the fourth column. The qualitative ef-
fects are similar, and, interestingly, the magnitudes are surprisingly close. In the alternative model,
adopting QPQ has a 5.54 percent eﬀect on China’s welfare compared to the baseline case, where
the diﬀerence is 4.69 percent. The intuition for the diﬀerence is that when transfers are imposed
in the baseline model, reductions in intensity q oﬀset China’s welfare gain. In contrast, in the
alternative speciﬁcation with outright expropriation, oﬀsetting reductions in intensity do not take
place. (There is no point in lowering q if the amount extracted does not depend on it.) Turning
to the eﬀects on the United States, we see that the welfare eﬀect of changing policy is a quarter
percent in the alternative speciﬁcation, compared with half a percent in the baseline. When forced
transfers are eliminated in the baseline, foreign aﬃliates respond by increasing intensity, thereby
magnifying the diﬀerence in foreign aﬃliate welfare.
The next two robustness exercises concern assumptions about how policies are assumed to
change over time. In the baseline model, we assume that tax rates on corporate proﬁts are ﬁxed
over time. China actually lowered rates, in part to attract greater foreign investment. The ﬁfth
56 We have also veriﬁed that even with the reduced beneﬁt from technology transfer in this alternative speciﬁca-
tion, China continues to prefer multilateral imposition of QPQ to no QPQ.
34column in Table 11, labeled “China’s Tax Rate Lowered,” shows the results if we lower the tax
rate on proﬁts in China from 33 percent to 25 percent, with most of the decline occurring after
2005 as observed. The results are nearly the same as in the baseline model, although the model
predicts a slightly higher share, namely 8.0 percent, of world nontransferred capital for China in
2010, because lower taxes cause an increase in productive activity in China. We view this result
as an upper bound because the rates of the other countries are ﬁxed in this simulation. If we
allow tax rates in other countries to vary as well, the model statistics would be even closer to the
baseline, since all countries in our sample have seen some fall in corporate tax rates.
In the baseline model, we allow QPQ policy to vary over time. The exercise illustrated in
the sixth column in Table 11, labeled “Time Invariant QPQ,” shuts down this variation, requiring
the time series ¯ ht to be ﬁxed at its 1990 level. Although the QPQ policy function is ﬁxed, in the
alternative speciﬁcation, the equilibrium intensity level (q) increases over time. Because of the
convexity of the policy function, equilibrium transfer rates also increase, although the increase is
less than in the baseline. (In the baseline, the transfer rate h(q) starts at 0.2 percent and rises
to 4.4 percent by 2010. The alternative starts at the same rate, 0.2 percent, but rises to only
3.4 percent.) With less QPQ in 2010, there is more innovation in China, greater outward FDI,
and lower welfare gains to China from unilateral QPQ. Nevertheless, the diﬀerences in magnitudes
between the alternative speciﬁcation and the baseline are quantitatively small.
Finally, in the baseline model, we assume that China and BRI both impose QPQ policies with
identical parameters. This exercise, illustrated in the last column of Table 11, labeled “No QPQ in
BRI,” assumes instead that the BRI countries are similar to the advanced countries in that they
have zero QPQ. The diﬀerence in China’s welfare gain due to QPQ between this speciﬁcation and
the baseline is negligible.
In Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) we report the results of additional sensitivity
analyses, verifying that our results are robust to alternative country groupings and model param-
eterizations. The alternative country groupings we consider are: (i) Korea is included with Japan
rather than ROW because of the recent rise in Korean high technology industries; (ii) ROW is
eliminated to quantify various assumptions about the diﬀerences between ROW and the advanced
countries made in the baseline model; and (iii) BVI and the Cayman Island net inﬂows to China
are included with the advanced country ﬂows to check our baseline assumption that ﬂows from
these tax shelters are simply round-tripping on the part of Chinese multinationals.57 We also vary
the parameters listed in Table 3 and the elasticity of the quid pro quo cost function, h
j
it(q). In all
cases, we ﬁnd that China’s quid pro quo policy has had a signiﬁcant impact on global innovation
and welfare, and we ﬁnd that the quantitative predictions are hardly aﬀected.
57 For more on the measurement complicationswith round-tripping, see Xiao (2004) and Sutherland and Matthews
(2009).
358. Summary
This paper assesses the economic impact of China’s quid pro quo policy, which makes tech-
nology capital transfer a requirement for market access. Analysis of Chinese patent data indicates
that the terms of quid pro quo arrangements are such that transferred property rights apply inside
China, not outside. We incorporate the policy into a quantitative, multicountry general equilib-
rium model and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on advanced country welfare from the policy, approximately
equal to 0.4 percent of consumption. China’s economy is now large enough that its policies have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on R&D decisions throughout the world. China gains signiﬁcantly from the
policy—almost 5 percent of consumption—and China prefers to follow it, even if other countries
also adopt the policy.
Although the model is detailed in several respects—in particular, it is capable of generating the
equilibrium transition of a macro model with six economies having signiﬁcantly diﬀerent policies—
a variety of simplifying assumptions have necessarily been made. These assumptions include an
aggregate technology with a single consumption good with no scope for “wool for wine” trade. As a
conceptual matter, it is straightforward to generalize the model to multiple industries, generating
trade in consumption goods based on comparative advantage. Such an extension would allow
for industry-speciﬁc technology capital and for technology and policy parameters to vary across
industries. Indeed, regulation of FDI in China does vary by industries. Our paper hints at this
variation, allowing quid pro quo parameters to be high for an advanced economy like the United
States, with its high-technology industries such as motor vehicles and aerospace, which are heavily
regulated in the actual policy. An explicit industry-level analysis would be an interesting topic
for future work but would require enhanced data sets. Finally, there remains the issue of how
productivity changes as technology is transferred. Our baseline model assumes that innovators
and appropriators are equally productive. We also explored a 10 percent transfer discount in our
robustness analysis. The transfer discount was set arbitrarily, however, and further work on this
potentially signiﬁcant issue is warranted.
In our model, multinational ﬁrms bring technology to other countries through FDI. Earlier, we
noted that policies that block FDI entirely and require technology inﬂows to work through licensing
deals can also include a quid pro quo element. In fact, we can take our model and restructure
the contracts, and then reinterpret the outcomes as licensing rather than as FDI. In this case,
measured technology ﬂows will show up as royalties in the trade statistics instead of FDI in the
capital accounts. Future work could extend our analysis to include these licensing deals, and an
interesting application is to explore the growth experiences of Japan and Korea, which have both
relied heavily on licensing.
36A. Data Sources
In this appendix, we report on our data sources. All of our data and computer codes are
available at our website, www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr486.html.
Three main sources of patent data are used in the analysis of Section 3. For the published
patents in China, we used data on individual patents obtained from patent searches at the State
Intellectual Property Oﬃce of China (SIPO). The original data set includes all published invention
and utility patents over the period 1985 to 2010 (3.6 million published patents). We restrict at-
tention to invention patents published over the period 2005–2010 (1.4 million published patents).
For U.S. published patent applications, we obtained the raw text ﬁles for published U.S. patent
applications at the Google Bulk Patent Download site (www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto.html).
Data are provided at this site through an arrangement between Google and the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce. Applications were ﬁrst published in 2000. Our data begin there and
extend through 2012, and include 3.3 million published applications. For the WIPO published
patent applications, we obtained WIPO applications from patent searches at the WIPO web site
(patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/search.jsf). Our data include patent years 1999–2012 (1.8 million
applications).
Data on the top 500 foreign aﬃliate sales discussed in Section 3 are provided by China’s
Ministry of Commerce and were downloaded at www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI. The ﬁles posted at our
website contain the sales volumes and names of the top 500 foreign aﬃliates doing business in
China. We used the ﬁles for 2006 and 2007. We used Google Translate to translate aﬃliate names.
The main data used for the analysis of our quantitative model in Section 5 are populations,
GDPs, FDI ﬂows, and estimates of proﬁts tax rates. The source of data on country popula-
tions and GDPs is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database (World
Bank, 1960–2012). Speciﬁcally, we use total population (sp.pop.totl), GDP in current U.S. dol-
lars (ny.gdp.mktp.cd), and GDP at purchasing power parity in constant 2005 international dollars
(ny.gdp.pcap.pp.kd).58
Several sources are used for foreign direct investments. For China, data on inward FDI (actu-
ally utilized) are available for the period 1990–2010 by source country from the China Statistical
Yearbook (China National Bureau of Statistics, 1990–2012). Outward FDI data by host country
are available starting in 2003 from the China Commerce Yearbook (China Ministry of Commerce
2003–2012). Prior to 2003, we use total FDI ﬂows reported by the United Nations in their UNC-
TADstat and China’s 2003 outward FDI stocks to estimate the bilateral ﬂows. Speciﬁcally, we
construct pro rata shares of the total ﬂow, with the shares equal to the ratio of a host country’s
stock in 2003 relative to the total outward FDI stock from China.
To construct FDI for China, we include inward and outward ﬂows to and from the provinces of
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan and subtract out any ﬂows between the provinces. Hong Kong’s
Census and Statistics Department publishes data on inward FDI by major investor country and
58 The WDI does not publish data for Taiwan and has missing years for some countries. We use the International
Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database (IMF, 1990–2012) and the United Nation’s National
Accounts Main Aggregates Database (UN, 1990–2012) to ﬁll in the missing data.
37outward FDI by major recipient. The data are available starting in 1997. As with China, we
use stocks for the ﬁrst year data are available and total FDI ﬂows from UNCTAD to construct
estimates for the pre-1997 bilateral ﬂows. As before, the estimates are found by multiplying the
total ﬂow reported by UNCTAD by the ratio of a country’s stock of FDI in 1997 to the total
stock. We do this for ﬂows in and out of Hong Kong. Macao’s Statistics and Census Service
publishes bilateral FDI statistics starting in 2001. The ﬂows and stocks are small relative to the
other Chinese provinces, especially at the start, and therefore we simply assume they are zero for
the period 1990–2000. Taiwan does not report bilateral ﬂows. Where available, we use statistics
of bilateral FDI ﬂows to and from Taiwan reported by other countries, and we use UNCTAD data
for Taiwan’s FDI totals.
For OECD countries other than the United States, we use FDI statistics, which are available
for their partner countries, reported to the OECD by member countries (see OECD 1990–2010).
As in the case of China, we subtract out any FDI ﬂows between the European countries when
constructing FDI statistics for Western Europe. The United States data come directly from the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis because there is typically a lag in reporting revised data to the
OECD.
We do not have all bilateral ﬂows for the combined entities BRI or ROW, but do have total
inward ﬂows. The source of the total inward ﬂows is UNCTADstat. Without bilateral ﬂows, it
is not possible to subtract out ﬂows to and from countries within a group of countries. Instead,
we construct population-weighted ratios of FDI to GDP, which we interpret as the typical ratio
for countries in that group. Then, to get total FDI ﬂows, we multiply the weighted ratio by total
GDP for the group.
The main source of data for tax rates on proﬁts is the OECD Tax Database (OECD 1990–
2012). For non-OECD countries, we use estimates compiled by the accounting ﬁrm KPMG Inter-
national (1993–2012).
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43Table 1
Published Patent Applications in China for Large Foreign
Multinationals and Domestic Chinese Firms, 2005–2010
Number of % Linked to U.S. or
Type of Applicant Patents WIPO Application
A. All Industries
Foreign multinational 209,594 82.1
Shared with Chinese partners 10,184 1.7
Exclusive 199,410 86.2
Only patents ﬁrst ﬁled in China
Chinese ﬁrms 585,650 4.7
Top 100 domestic patenters 79,518 16.5
Not top 100 506,132 2.8
Foreign multinational
Shared with Chinese partners 10,075 1.5
Exclusive 12,446 10.1
Foreign multinational, Chinese inventor and location
Shared with Chinese partners 7,446 2.0
Exclusive 2,113 10.6
B. Automobile Industry
Foreign multinational
Shared with Chinese partners 142 0.7
Exclusive 14,500 85.0
Chinese ﬁrms
Company has joint venture 936 0.9
Independent company 3,277 7.4
Note.—Authors’ calculations are based on microdata on published patents in China. Patent counts include only
invention patents. See Appendix A and Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2013) for more details.
44Table 2
Indicators of High Technology for Country Groupings, 2000
Number of Triadic Patents Value Added of Knowledge- and
Granted Annually Technology-Intensive Industries
(per million in population) (as a percentage of GDP)
China 0.1 20.2
United States 49.1 36.3
Western Europe 36.3 28.7
Japan 117.0 28.4
Brazil-Russia-India 0.1 19.3
Rest of world 3.5 24.8
Note.—Triadic patent counts are obtained from the OECD Patents by Technology database (variable: Triadic
patent families). Total populations are taken from the World Development Indicators (variable: sp.pop.totl). Data
on high-technology production are reported in NSF (2012, Table 6-1). These industries include knowledge-intensive
services and high-technology manufacturing classiﬁed by the OECD. Knowledge-intensive services include education,
health, and business, ﬁnancial, and communications services. High-technology manufacturing industries include
aerospace, communications and semiconductors, computers and oﬃce machinery, pharmaceuticals, and scientiﬁc
instruments and measuring equipment.
45Table 3
Model Parameters Common Across Countries
Parameter Expression Value
Preferences
Discount factor β .98
Leisure weight ψ 1.32
Growth rates (%)
Population γN 1.0
Technology γA 1.2
Income shares (%)
Technology capital φ 7.0
Tangible capital (1 − φ)αT 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1 − φ)αI 6.5
Labor (1 − φ)(1−αT−αI) 65.1
Nonbusiness sector (%)
Fraction of time at work ¯ Lnb 6
Investment share ¯ Xnb/GDP 15
Value-added share ¯ Ynb/GDP 31
Depreciation rates (%)
Technology capital δM 8.0
Tangible capital δT 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital δI 0
Tax rates (%)
Labor wedge τl 34
Dividends τd 28
Note.—Parameters are taken from McGrattan and Prescott’s (2010) analysis of the U.S. current account. See
Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) for a sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameter choices.
Table 4
Populations Relative to the United States, Selected Years
China U.S. W. Europe Japan BRI ROW
1990 465 100 151 49 469 172
1995 463 100 144 47 479 175
2000 458 100 138 45 487 177
2005 451 100 136 43 497 182
2010 442 100 133 41 505 185
Note.—The source of these data is the World Bank, World Development Indicators database. Holmes, McGrattan,
and Prescott (2014) report all years.
46Table 5
Estimated Paths for TFP and Degrees of Openness, Selected Years
China U.S. W. Europe Japan BRI ROW
TFPs Relative to United States
1990 13.5 100 80.5 92.4 20.0 34.0
1995 16.3 100 80.6 89.2 20.0 35.2
2000 20.3 100 80.6 88.0 20.1 36.4
2005 24.5 100 80.7 88.0 21.5 37.6
2010 27.8 100 80.7 88.0 21.7 38.6
2015 29.7 100 80.8 88.0 21.7 39.5
Degree of Openness to FDI
1990 .667 .849 .852 .689 .654 .775
1995 .717 .849 .852 .689 .656 .775
2000 .793 .852 .853 .694 .679 .780
2005 .809 .863 .856 .716 .782 .804
2010 .811 .870 .858 .730 .850 .819
2015 .811 .871 .858 .732 .859 .821
Note.—See footnote for Table 6.
Table 6
Quid Pro Quo Costs, Selected Years
FDI of Advanced Countries FDI of China FDI of BRI
in China in BRI in BRI in China
1990 .002 .006 .011 .003
1995 .010 .009 .008 .010
2000 .026 .012 .008 .023
2005 .038 .022 .016 .031
2010 .044 .036 .029 .037
2015 .045 .039 .035 .041
Note.—Parameters governing TFPs, degrees of openness, and quid pro quo costs are chosen to align model and
data trends for real GDP, inward FDI, and the share of FDI from advanced countries into China. Values for quid
pro quo costs are indexed by source and host of FDI. In equilibrium, the diﬀerences between values in the case of
FDI coming from the United States, Western Europe, and Japan are less than 1 percent, so we report only one value
for China and one value for BRI. See text for details and Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) for parameter
values in all years.
47Table 7
Share of World Technology Capital (%), Selected Years
China U.S. W. Europe Japan BRI ROW
1990 0.1 31.6 36.7 17.2 2.2 12.2
1995 0.6 30.5 34.5 16.2 4.6 13.5
2000 2.3 29.4 32.5 14.8 6.6 14.4
2005 4.4 28.3 31.1 13.8 7.4 15.1
2010 6.1 27.8 30.5 13.2 6.4 16.0
Note.—The share for country i is Mi
it/
 
i Mi
it.
Table 8
Ratio of Technology Capital to GDP in China and BRI, Selected Years
Technology Capital of China Technology Capital of BRI
Nontransferred Transferred Nontransferred Transferred
1990 0.00 0.83 0.06 0.49
1995 0.04 0.55 0.14 0.35
2000 0.09 0.38 0.20 0.27
2005 0.14 0.34 0.20 0.24
2010 0.16 0.35 0.16 0.30
Note.—The nontransferred capital share for country i is Mi
it/GDPit and the transferred capital share is ˜ Mit/GDPit.
Table 9
Technology Capital of Advanced Countries in China and BRI, Selected Years
FDI in China FDI in BRI
Multinationals’ Share of Multinationals’ Share of
Intensity Technology Capital Intensity Technology Capital
Level Not Transferred Level Not Transferred
1990 0.21 0.79 0.29 0.79
1995 0.34 0.86 0.33 0.86
2000 0.41 0.86 0.35 0.88
2005 0.41 0.82 0.36 0.88
2010 0.35 0.77 0.33 0.84
Note.—The intensity level for multinationals j in country i is equal to q
j
it. In equilibrium, the diﬀerences between
intensity levels of multinationals from the United States, Europe, and Japan are less than 1 percent, so we report
only one value for China and one value for BRI and refer to these values as the intensity levels of the advanced
countries. Technology capital not transferred is deﬁned to be the ratio
 
j M
j
it/( ˜ Mit +
 
j M
j
it) where the sums
over j include only multinationals from the United States, Europe, and Japan.
48Table 10
Welfare Gains and Technology Capital Transfers,
Arising from Policy Changes Starting 1991, 1990–2010
China U.S. W. Europe Japan BRI ROW
A. China ends QPQ policy
Welfare gain (%) 4.69 −0.45 −0.43 −0.32 −1.34 −0.10
Nontransferred capital ratio 0.43 0.96 0.94 0.92 1.11 1.02
Total capital ratio 1.46 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.95 1.02
B. China and BRI both end QPQ policy
Welfare gain (%) 4.37 −0.96 −0.92 −0.75 4.61 −0.28
Nontransferred capital ratio 0.44 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.54 1.04
Total capital ratio 1.48 0.92 0.90 0.87 1.36 1.04
C. China stops taxing proﬁts of advanced countries
Welfare gain (%) 0.99 −0.18 −0.18 −0.08 −0.14 −0.05
Nontransferred capital ratio 1.04 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.05 1.01
Total capital ratio 1.02 0.97 0.97 0.96 1.00 1.01
D. Advanced countries all implement QPQ policy
Welfare gain (%) 1.98 −0.74 −0.64 −8.57 2.30 0.09
Nontransferred capital ratio 0.79 1.25 1.33 6.13 0.88 0.91
Total capital ratio 1.14 0.90 0.96 0.89 1.17 0.91
Note.—The welfare gains are the percentage increase in paths of consumption necessary for households in a
speciﬁed country to be indiﬀerent between having the new policy listed in Panels A through D versus its actual
policies. The capital ratios are ratios of the nontransferred capital and total (transferred plus nontransferred) capital
stocks in 2010 for each country, with the numerators equal to the stocks consistent with the policies China actually
followed, and the denominators equal to the stocks consistent with the counterfactual policies. Advanced countries
are United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
49Table 11
Results for Alternative Model Specifications
Variations of the Baseline Model
Add Transfer Theft and China’s Time No
Baseline Knowledge TFP Disparate Tax Rate Invariant QPQ
Model Spillovers Discount Openness Lowered QPQ in BRI
2010 values for China:
Share of world
technology capital (%) 6.1 5.9 7.6 6.1 8.0 7.4 7.5
Capital-GDP ratios
Nontransferred capital 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.17
Transferred capital 0.35 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.28
Cumulated outward
to inward FDI 0.53 0.52 0.70 0.53 0.61 0.65 0.72
Policy analysis:
Welfare due to QPQ (%)
China 4.69 4.51 4.24 5.54 4.61 4.18 4.70
United States −.45 −.48 −.42 −.24 −.38 −.35 −.33
Nontransferred capital ratio
China 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.38 0.53 0.52 0.51
United States 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.99
Total capital ratio
China 1.46 1.45 1.45 1.31 1.42 1.38 1.23
United States 0.96 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.99
Note.—Results for the baseline model are also shown in Tables 9–12 and Figure 6. The experiments are as
follows: “Add Knowledge Spillovers” has g(µ) > 1 for all countries; “Transfer TFP Discount” has ζ = 0.9; “Theft
and Disparate Openness” is isomorphic to the baseline model but in the counterfactual experiment the intensity
levels are held ﬁxed at their baseline values; “China’s Tax Rate Lowered” assumes that China’s corporate proﬁts tax
rate falls from 33 percent to 25 percent, with most of the decline occurring between 2005 and 2009; “Time Invariant
QPQ” has a quid pro quo cost function that is not time-varying; and “No QPQ in BRI” has h
j
BRI,t(q) for all j.
The same procedure for choosing parameters in the baseline model is applied in all variations of the baseline. See
Section 5.1 for details and Holmes, McGrattan, and Prescott (2014) for a list of all parameter inputs.
50Figure 1. Inward Foreign Direct Investment to Chinaa
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Figure 2. Outward Foreign Direct Investment from Chinaa
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a Includes inward and outward ﬂows to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao with intraprovincial ﬂows netted.
Excludes ﬂows to and from the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands.
51Figure 3. Real Per Capita GDP Relative to United States
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Figure 4. Cumulative Inward FDI Relative to Trend GDP,
Normalized by 2010 Estimate for China
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52Figure 5. Share of Inward FDI to China from the
United States, Western Europe, and Japan
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Figure 6. Cumulative Outward FDI Relative to Trend GDP,
Normalized by 2010 Estimate of Inward FDI to China
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